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Regaining Digital Privacy? The New 
“Right to be Forgotten” and Online 
Expression 
Fiona Brimblecombe* & Gavin Phillipson**
This article considers how the newly-formulated “Right to be Forgotten” in Article 17 of 
the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation will apply to “online expression”, 
that is, content placed online via social and other forms of media. It starts by seeking 
to refute the argument that the widespread sharing of personal information online 
means that digital privacy no longer matters, considering in particular the key role that 
privacy as informational control plays in self-actualisation and how the advent of a 
right to erase may alter judicial understandings of informational autonomy. It goes on 
to consider some of the key interpretive dilemmas posed by Article 17, in particular the 
questions of when individuals and online intermediaries may be fixed with obligations 
under the Regulation and who may claim the broad “journalism exemption”; in doing so 
it contests the notion that the privacy obligations of social media platforms like Facebook 
should invariably be treated differently from those of search engines like Google. It 
then goes on to argue that the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court, is likely to 
be an important factor in the interpretation of the new right, and how it is balanced 
with freedom of expression. Using a variety of data dissemination scenarios it considers 
how Strasbourg’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, and the factors that underlie 
it, might apply to the resolution of different kinds of erasure claims under Article 17. 
In doing so it analyses the applicability of a number of relevant factors drawn from the 
Strasbourg case law, including the content of the personal data in question, its form, 
whether the data subject is a “public figure”, implied “waiver” of privacy rights, how the 
data was collected and disseminated and whether it relates to something that occurred 
in a physically public location.
* Tutor in Law and Doctoral Candidate, Durham Law School, Durham 
University. 
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I. Introduction 
No-one living in a European Union country could fail to have noticed that on 25th May 2018, a new data protection regime came into 
force across the EU — the General Data Protection Regulation.1 Work 
on the final stages of this article was punctuated by the constant arrival 
of “GDPR emails” from various organisations, imploring the authors 
to “stay in touch” by consenting to the continuing use of their contact 
details. As the emails piled up in inboxes, GDPR jokes proliferated 
on Twitter.2 But beyond the mundane requirements of ensuring some 
control for the storing of personal data like email addresses, the GDPR 
introduced something both far more controversial but also shrouded in 
considerable mystery: an explicit “right to be forgotten” (“RTBF”).3 As is 
well known, a limited right along these lines derives from a famous case 
decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”): Google 
Spain SL v Agencia Española de protección de Datos, which interpreted 
the right to erasure under the previous Data Protection Directive 1995 
so as to give individuals rights in relation to search indexing.4 This has 
given rise to (at the last count) 680,000 requests for delisting, which have 
led to over 1.8 million URLs being removed from search results, amid 
1. EC, Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119/1 [GDPR]. The GDPR replaced the 
previous Data Protection Directive 95/46 EC [1995 Directive].
2. Martin Belam, “Businesses Resort To Desperate Emailing as GDPR 
Deadline Looms” The Guardian (24 May 2018), online: The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/24/businesses-
resort-to-desperate-emailing-as-gdpr-deadline-looms>
3. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17. This goes considerably further than the right 
to erasure in Article 12(b) of the Directive, supra note 1. 
4. Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (13 May 2014), C-131/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (CJEU) [Google Spain]. The right to erasure 
appeared in the previous 1995 Directive, supra note 1, art 12(b); the 
judgment also referenced the right to object in Article 14. 
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considerable controversy.5 However this right was limited — at least in 
the original judgment — to requesting Google and other search engines 
to de-list certain search results:  Google Spain did not itself cover the right 
to request the deletion of actual content.6 Hence while that decision was 
controversial world-wide,7 the GDPR, in introducing a more detailed, 
5. Daphne Keller, “The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws 
and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation” Social Sciences Research 
Network (22 March 2017), online: SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914684> at 25 [Keller, “Right Tools”]. The 
searches referred to are those made under an individual’s name. 
6. See Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 34–35 citing Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. 
v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
Gonzales C-131/12”, (2014) 14/EN (WP 225) at 2, online: <http://www.
dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument?id=1080> [Article 29 Google 
Spain Guidelines] (Keller has pointed out that “data protection regulators 
have said that Google de-listings do not significantly threaten [free speech] 
rights, precisely because information is still available on the webpage”). 
However, as David Erdos has noted, there have been several judgments at 
the domestic level applying Google Spain that have resulted in deletion of 
substantive content: for examples see David Erdos, “Delimiting the Ambit 
of Responsibility of Intermediary Publishers for Third Party Rights in 
European Data Protection: Towards a Synthetic Interpretation of the EU 
acquis” (2018) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
1–37 [Erdos, Intermediary Publishers].
7. See e.g. Eduardo Ustaran, “The Wider Effect of the ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ Case” (2014)14:8 Privacy & Data Protection 8; Paul Bernal, 
“The Right to Be Forgotten in the Post-Snowden Era” (2014) 5:1 Privacy 
in Germany (10 August 2014), online: PinG <www.pingdigital.de/ce/
the-right-to-be-forgotten-in-the-post-snowden-era/detail.html>; Daniel 
Solove, “What Google Must Forget: The EU Ruling on the Right to be 
Forgotten”, LinkedIn (13 May 2014), online: LinkedIn <https://www.
linkedin.com/pulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-google-must-
forget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten>.
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comprehensive and explicit RTBF, will be more contentious still.8 It 
should be of interest to Canadians, for two reasons. First, the GDPR has 
extra-territorial effect:9 it will apply to entities based outside the EU that 
provide services to EU citizens involving the processing of their personal 
data. As is well known, Google Spain applied EU data protection law 
to Google, on the basis that it had a subsidiary base within the EU. 
But second, a Canadian version of RTBF is in the offing: the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recently concluded that such a 
right10 already exists in Canadian law.11 Canadian regulators and courts 
applying this right may well draw inspiration from European case law 
and regulatory practice arising under Article 17. 
But what does the new provision actually mean, how will it work and 
how will it be reconciled with freedom of expression? Answers to these 
questions are far from easy, in part because scholars are only just starting 
to grapple with the new regime. As leading commentator Daphne Keller 
puts it, while “oceans of scholarly ink have been spilled discussing the 
8. For reaction so far see e.g. Meg Ambrose, “It’s About Time: Privacy, 
Information Life Cycles, and the Right to be Forgotten” (2013) 16:2 
Stanford Technology Law Review 369; Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right 
to be Forgotten” (2012) 64:88 Stanford Law Review Online; Diane 
Zimmerman, “The ‘New’ Privacy and the ‘Old’: Is Applying the Tort 
Law of Privacy Like Putting High Button Shoes on the Internet?” (2012) 
17:2 Communications Law and Policy 107; Paul Schwartz, “The EU-US 
Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures” (2013) 126:7 
Harvard Law Review 1966. 
9. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 3, art 3(1) and 2(1)(a) (it applies to “the 
processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the [EU] by a 
controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing 
activities are related to … the offering of … services … to such data 
subjects in the [EU]” at art 3(2)(a).
10. That is a right both to require search engines to ‘de-index’ certain results 
and to require individual websites to take data down. 
11. See e.g. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 
2000, c 5; and Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Draft 
OPC Position on Online Reputation” (26 January 2018) online: OPC 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/
consultation-on-online-reputation/pos_or_201801>.
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Google Spain case … the same cannot be said of the … GDPR”.12 But 
this is also because major questions generated by the new regime remain 
beset by uncertainty. As Keller puts it: “[e]ven Data Protection experts 
can’t say for sure how the GDPR answers hugely consequential questions, 
like whether hosting platforms [such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube 
and Tumblr] must carry out RTBF removals”,13 partly because of the 
sometimes “opaque” drafting of the GDPR.14 There is also ambiguity 
around how far individuals using social media may themselves become 
fixed with obligations under the GDPR.15 
These questions are important because the record of de-listing 
requests made under Google Spain gives us good reason to believe that 
social media companies will be a key target for Article 17 requests: 
George Brock found that “[t]he eight sites for which Google receives 
the most requests are either social media or profiling sites” and of 
these, requests to delink to Facebook posts have been the single largest 
category, with “some 130,000 Facebook links … removed from view” 
by May 2016.16 Hence the question of whether individuals and social 
media platforms should be treated as data controllers will very quickly 
assume great practical importance. Both groups, if exposed to potential 
data protection obligations, will also want to know whether they can 
claim the benefit of the broad, “journalistic” exemption.17 Ordinary 
people will also want to know if they can at least claim their own freedom 
of expression as a defence, even if they cannot claim to be acting for 
journalistic purposes. These major uncertainties have not comforted 
12. Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 26.
13. Ibid at 30.
14. Ibid at 31.
15. See below, Part III.C.1. 
16. George Brock, The Right to be Forgotten: Privacy and the Media in the 
Digital Age (London: IB Tauris, 2016) at 51. 
17. There are four “special purposes” under which national law may grant 
exemptions from GDPR obligations under Article 85(2); the others 
being “academic”, “literary” and “artistic” purposes. Either or both of the 
“academic” and “journalistic” exemptions may be relevant to academics 
blogging and using social media to promote and discuss their areas of 
research. See further below at 24, and Part III.C.3. 
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those expressing strong concern about the possible impact of all this 
on online freedom of expression, especially what some commentators 
have analysed as structural and procedural features that will push online 
intermediaries like Google and Facebook in the direction of acceding to 
RTBF requests even when unsound.18 It is possible that national courts 
and legislatures, under pressure from media and the web giants, may seek 
to ameliorate the likely effect of the GDPR on their operations. Some 
national courts have at times been ready to cut down sharply the scope of 
key data protection definitions — such as “personal data” — in order to 
limit the impact of EU data protection rules on national law.19 
There is clear guidance from the CJEU that EU data protection law 
must be interpreted and applied in a way that respects the “fundamental 
rights of the [EU] legal order”20 which now include the basic rights to 
privacy, data protection and freedom of expression in the European 
Union Charter on Fundamental Rights.21 Moreover, crucially, for the 
purposes of this article, the Court has said that guarantees in the Charter 
that are cognate to those in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) must be interpreted so as to give them “the same meaning 
and scope”22 as the ECHR rights — in this case the more long-standing 
18. See e.g. infra note 157. 
19. For example, the UK Court of Appeal interpreted the notoriously 
broad concept of “personal data” narrowly by finding that whether an 
individual’s data constitutes personal data depends inter alia on whether it 
is “information that affects his privacy, whether in his personal or family 
life, business or professional capacity” see Durant v Financial Services 
Authority, [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 at para 28. 
20. Lindqvist v Aklagarkammaren I Jonkoping, C-101/01, [2003] ECR at 
I-12992 [Lindqvist].
21. EC, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ, 
C 364/01 [EU Charter] (Articles 7, 8, and 10 protecting, respectively 
privacy, data protection and freedom of expression).
22. Philip Morris Brands SARL v Secretary of State for Health, 
C-547/14, [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:325 (CJEU); see also 
Bernard Connolly v Commission of the European Communities, C-274/99, 
[2001] ECR I-1638 at paras 37–42; see also Article 52(3) of the EU 
Charter, below at 40.
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ECHR rights to privacy and freedom of expression.23 Hence an important 
guide to the meaning of Article 17 is likely to be the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (“the Strasbourg 
Court”). This is particularly so given that, as Keller observes, “[c]ases 
balancing rights to expression versus privacy … exist — but those rarely 
involve Data Protection, or set out rules for [online service providers], 
as opposed to ordinary publishers or speakers.”24 The one decision 
Keller cites here is the leading Strasbourg decision of Von Hannover v 
Germany25 — which involved a traditional privacy claim against the print 
media. Hence a key enterprise of this paper: to try to figure out how the 
newly-formulated right to be forgotten will apply to online expression 
by drawing out relevant principles from the privacy case-law of the 
Strasbourg Court and applying them to this new situation. We should 
stress that our endeavour is limited to how the primary right should be 
construed, whom it will bind and who may claim exemptions from it 
by reference to the countervailing right of freedom of expression or the 
journalistic exemption. We do not go on to consider the substantive 
content of the freedom of expression side of the balance:26 that would 
23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 arts 8–10 (entered into 
force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]. Article 8 provides: “(1) Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence”. The second paragraph provides for restrictions only as 
they are provided for by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, such as the 
prevention of disorder or crime, or “protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others” and are necessary to protect these other rights or interests, 
which imports a proportionality test. Article 10 provides in para 1 that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”; the second paragraph 
provides a similar set of exceptions to para 2 of Article 8.
24. Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at n 186. 
25. No 59320/00, [2004] VI ECHR 41 [Von Hannover]. 
26. On balancing speech and privacy rights under the ECHR see, generally, 
e.g. Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the UK 
Human Rights Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) ch 1–2, 
15; Eric Barendt, “Balancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy: The 
Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court” (2009) 1:1 Journal of Media Law 
49.
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require a separate paper. 
This article is structured as follows. Part II will first sketch the 
challenges our contemporary online environment poses to traditional 
notions of privacy and explain how the RTBF offers the potential for 
greater privacy protection; in doing so it will answer some common 
objections to the notion of seeking to protect the privacy of users who 
themselves frequently disclose aspects of their own private life online. 
Part III will then set out the basic right under Article 17 and place it 
within the framework of the GDPR; it will consider some key interpretive 
questions that arise, including the potential legal responsibilities as “data 
controllers” of individuals and social media platforms under the GDPR 
and whether they may invoke the defence of freedom of expression 
and/or “journalistic purposes” when doing so. Part IV will introduce 
Strasbourg’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and the multiple 
different ways it could be applied to the right to be forgotten, depending 
on the circumstances in which the right is invoked. Part V will then 
move on to consider the individual factors the Strasbourg Court employs 
when assessing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists and its 
strength — a crucial factor when it comes to balancing privacy claims 
against competing free expression interests. The following factors will be 
discussed: (a) the content of the data; (b) its form; (c) whether the data 
subject is a public figure; (d) implied “waiver” of privacy rights; (e) how 
the data was collected and disseminated; (f ) whether the data relates to 
something that occurred in a physically public location.
10 
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II. Social Media and Self-Disclosure: The 
Abandonment of Privacy Online?
A. Why the Need for a Right to be Forgotten?
The right to erasure was formulated with the clear view of enhancing 
data privacy rights for EU citizens.27 It is thus a considered response to 
technological advances that have resulted in “personal information being 
posted online at a staggering rate”,28 driven by the increasing prominence 
of social networking sites,29 a digitised media,30 cloud computing31 and 
the widespread usage of websites in relation to professional life,32 dating,33 
and sex.34 A recent article noted that everyday 1.18 billion people will log 
into their Facebook accounts, often sharing both their own and other’s 
personal data, 3,500 million tweets will be sent, 95 million photos 
and videos will be posted on Instagram and Youtube content creators 
will upload 72 hours of new video every minute.35 A book published 
in 2014 recorded that Google processes, worldwide, over 3.5 billion 
searches a day. It adds, “the company had been in business more than a 
decade before it admitted that it had stored a record of every search ever 
27. Viviane Reding, “The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe 
the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital 
Age” European Commission Press Release Database (22 January 2012), 
online: European Commission <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-12-26_en.htm>. 
28. Daniel J Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on 
the Internet (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) at 19. 
29. 2.46 billion people worldwide now use social networking sites: see e.g. 
Statista, online: Statista <https://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-
networks/>.
30. See e.g. BBC News, online: BBC <www.bbc.co.uk/news>.
31. See e.g. Apple’s iCloud, online: Apple <www.apple.com/uk/icloud/>.
32. See e.g. LinkedIn, online: LinkedIn <https://gb.linkedin.com/>.
33. See e.g. Eharmony, online: Eharmony <www.eharmony.co.uk/home/rh-
seo/>; Match, online: Match <https://uk.match.com/>.
34. See e.g. Tinder, online: Tinder <https://www.gotinder.com/>.
35. Max Mills “Sharing Privately: the Effect Publication on Social Media Has 
on Expectations of Privacy” (2016) 9:1 Journal of Media Law 45. 
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requested”.36 What Solove calls “generation Google”37 became familiar 
from an increasingly young age38 with internet-enabled smartphones and 
tablets that can take, store and upload photographs in seconds, allowing 
for highly impulsive sharing. Meanwhile the popularity of blogging and 
vlogging, including by minors, continues to grow, with one study finding 
that many are more akin to “personal diaries” (37%) rather than being 
devoted to topics like politics (11%). Solove comments: 
As people chronicle the minutia of their daily lives from childhood onwards 
in blog entries, online conversations, photographs, and videos, they are forever 
altering their futures – and those of their friends, relatives, and others.39
Mayer-Schönberger’s seminal work, Delete, drew attention to the risks 
of a “loss of forgetting” in the digital age, with the huge quantity of 
personal data now “remembered” online, due to the “perfect recall” of 
the internet, threatening to reduce the personal autonomy of individuals 
and their ability to “move on” in their lives.40 As Solove puts it, people 
want the option of “starting over, of reinventing themselves” but may 
nowadays be hampered in doing so by their “digital baggage”.41 In this 
regard search engines play a crucial role, rendering information on 
incidents that happened years ago instantly retrievable world-wide. One 
author gives the example of a student posting on a blog that she spotted 
her teacher in a gay bar; when that kind of gossip circulated in hard copy 
36. Brock, supra note 16 at 20.
37. Daniel Solove, “Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet” in Saul 
Levmore & Martha Nussbaum, eds, The Offensive Internet: Speech, Privacy, 
and Reputation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010) 17 
[Solove, “Speech, Privacy”].
38. See e.g. Ofcom, “Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes Report” 
(October 2014), online: Ofcom <stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/
research/media-literacy/media-use-attitudes-14/Childrens_2014_Report.
pdf> (stating that almost 8 in 10 children aged 12–15 own a mobile 
phone and there has been an increase since 2013 in those children using 
such phones to go online).
39. Daniel Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the 
Internet (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2007) at 24.
40. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital 
Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2009). 
41. Solove, “Speech, Privacy”, supra note 37 at 18. 
12 
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student gossip sheets, it would have been buried in obscurity within a few 
months. Nowadays, “a person thinking of hiring the teacher twenty years 
later” can find that information “with just a few keystrokes”.42 
B. Theoretical Dimensions
We have thus far suggested that this explosion of personal data online, 
and the harm it can do, shows why we need a right to delete. However 
we must at this point consider a commonly advanced objection: that, 
not only has the internet rendered privacy laws more difficult to enforce 
but that the behaviour of people online shows that people today — 
particularly, it is said, young people — proves that they value self-
expression, or “transparency over informational privacy”.43 It is certainly a 
common trope to bemoan the prevalence of “young people who behave 
as if privacy doesn’t exist”44 or they “don’t care” about it.45 When the Pew 
Foundation canvassed the views of experts, one wrote “[w]e have seen the 
emergence of publicity as the default modality”46 while the Foundation 
summed up their collective view as being that “privacy [is] no longer a 
‘condition’ of American life”.47 In order to respond to this argument it is 
42. Geoffrey R Stone, “Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet” in 
Saul Levmore & Martha Nussbaum, eds, The Offensive Internet: Speech, 
Privacy, and Reputation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2010) 192.
43. Ibid at 193 (emphasis added). 
44. Emily Nussbaum, “Say Everything” New York (12 February 2007), online: 
New York <nymag.com/news/features/27341/>.
45. See e.g. Irina Raicu, “Young adults take more security measures for their 
online privacy than their elders” recode (2 November 2016), online: 
recode <https://www.recode.net/2016/11/2/13390458/young-millennials-
oversharing-security-digital-online-privacy>; see also Lee Rainie, “The 
state of privacy in post-Snowden America” Pew Research Center (21 
September 2016), online: Pew Research Center <www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/>.
46. Lee Rainie & Janne Anderson “The Future of Privacy” Pew Research 
Center (8 December 2014) quoting Stowe Boyd, online: Pew Research 
Center <www.pewinternet.org/2014/12/18/future-of-privacy>.
47. Ibid. 
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necessary to recall some basics from the theoretical literature on privacy.48 
We make no attempt to add substantively to that already copious 
literature: our aim is simply to highlight the relevance of a key distinction 
that is in danger of being forgotten in this discussion. In summary our 
argument is that views like the above may tempt us to overlook a fairly 
fundamental distinction: between privacy as a state-of-being, and privacy 
as a claim: a moral claim, that can also be a legal one. 
What is the essence of this distinction? The starting point is that 
privacy as a state-of-being is descriptive; privacy as a claim is normative. 
As a description of privacy, we consider that one of the most compelling 
comes from the scholarship of Ruth Gavison49 and Nicole Moreham:50 
that privacy is a state of “desired in-access to others”.51 “Access” to a 
person can obviously occur on a number of different levels: through 
touch, through sight (a peeping Tom), through hearing (by someone 
eavesdropping on a private conversation), through intrusion into our 
physical space (someone coming uninvited into your garden or home), 
or through a person accessing personal information about us (by reading 
our emails or other online private content). The argument in short is that 
our privacy depends upon the extent to which others can see or access 
us. This is why — to give simple examples — we have locked doors for 
toilets, and why we do not, by and large, undress in public: locked doors 
and clothes alike put some barriers in the way of the visual access others 
48. For a major recent work on privacy in a networked world see Julie 
E Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of 
Everyday Practice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
49. Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” (1980) 89:3 Yale Law 
Journal 421. 
50. Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and 
Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121:4 Law Quarterly Review 628. For an 
account along broadly similar lines, see also RB Parker “A Definition of 
Privacy” (1974) 27:2 Rutgers Law Review 275.
51. The “desired” element of course is to distinguish enjoying privacy from 
being marooned on a desert island, or in solitary confinement desperate 
for any human contact — it would be odd in such situations to describe 
someone as being in a state of perfect privacy: see e.g. Moreham, ibid at 
636, et seq. 
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have to us.52 We may also seek to bar access not to our writings but our 
identities, as where people blog anonymously online,53 a classic example 
of the key online phenomena Mills calls “sharing privately”. 54 A well-
known key effect of the internet is that the unwanted access to us that 
one or two people might obtain in the physical world (through prying 
or eavesdropping) can be instantaneously granted to millions of others 
— when images or recordings of a person are posted online. The online 
world therefore poses the “insidious threat that information shared has 
the capacity to be disseminated further, throughout social networking 
sites and even reaching mass media”.55 The literature is full of examples: 
an extreme one concerns a girl who, back in 2000, made intimate videos 
for her boyfriend of her stripping and masturbating; they were placed 
online by persons unknown and became some of the first “viral videos”, 
turning her into an accidental online porn star, with her own Wikipedia 
entry.56A more mundane example is the Daily Mail publishing Facebook 
photos of drunken “girls’ nights out” to a mass audience under the 
headline: “The ladettes who glorify their shameful antics on Facebook”.57 
The above discussion shows how a key contemporary concern is that 
greater access to the informational dimension of our private sphere will 
52. Kirsty Hughes analyses such behaviour as the placing of “privacy barriers” 
in the way of others; invasions of privacy occur when such barriers are 
breached: see Kirsty Hughes, “A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy 
and its Implications for Privacy Law” (2012) 75:5 The Modern Law 
Review 806. 
53. For a decision that failed to recognise the vital privacy-based interest in 
anonymous blogging see The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd, 
[2009] EWHC 1358 (QB). 
54. Mills, supra note 35 at 46. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Nussbaum, supra note 44. 
57. Andrew Levy, “The ladettes who glorify their shameful drunken antics 
on Facebook” Mail Online (5 November 2007), online: Mail Online 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-491668/The-ladettes-glorify-
shamefuldrunken-antics-Facebook.html>. Multiple extreme examples of 
such persecutory and harassing speech are discussed by Danielle Citron in 
Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2016). 
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diminish our privacy as a state-of-being. In response to this concern, 
people put forward a claim to privacy. Many have argued that this is best 
captured as being a claim for control over our personal information:58 that 
it is up to the individual how much of their private sphere — including 
information — they choose to share with others. Certainly, the notion 
of informational autonomy is the easiest to apply to the regulation of 
online privacy: both the EU and Strasbourg Courts have recognised it as 
a key value underlying both data protection and Article 8 ECHR. Recital 
7 of the GDPR states that, “[n]atural persons should have control of 
their own personal data”;59 the Strasbourg Court recently observed that 
Article 8 ECHR, the right to privacy, “provides for the right to a form of 
‘informational self-determination’”.60 It is when that control is taken from 
individuals — revealing images of them are posted online, their phone is 
58. Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1970) 
(Westin has argued that “privacy is the claim of individuals to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others” at 7); see also Alan Westin, “The Origins of 
Modern Claims to Privacy” in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed, Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 56; 
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context:Technology, Policy, and the Integrity 
of Social Life (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press 2009); Paul Gewirtz, 
“Privacy and Speech” (2001) 2001:1 The Supreme Court Review 139; 
Charles Fried, “Privacy” (1968) 77:3 Yale Law Journal 475, esp 482–43; 
Solove, “Speech, Privacy”, supra note 37 at 21 (Solove uses practical 
examples to show the keen desire for control over accessibility: over 
700,000 people complained to Facebook when it introduced News Feed, 
alerting people’s friends when their profile was changed or updated even 
though many of the complainants had publicly available profiles). 
59. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 7. 
60. Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland, No 931/13 
(27 January 2017) [Satakunnan]. 
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hacked,61 their email and telephone records accessed by government,62 or 
photos taken of them coming out of a drug treatment facility63 — that 
we can say their privacy has been “invaded”. 
From this one initial point emerges: while people can choose to give 
others greater or lesser “access” to their personal sphere, they cannot — 
as tabloid editors are prone to say as justification for publishing intrusive 
stories about publicity-seeking celebrities — “invade their own privacy”. 
It is only when someone’s control over their private sphere is taken from 
them that their privacy is invaded. That is, at least, the “old media” 
perspective. Applying this insight to social media is slightly more complex 
— but of far more universal application: it applies to all of us who post 
some kind of personal information online. It is true that our behaviour in 
doing this may show a very different attitude to privacy from that of our 
parents’ or grandparents’ generation;64 this leads to the argument, noted 
above, that such behaviour shows that people nowadays care more about 
transparency and expression than privacy. 
To address this argument, we must consider the complex relationship 
between the needs of self-expression and sociability and of privacy, 
used in a descriptive sense. We draw close to people by giving them 
access to us — to our thoughts, our vulnerabilities, homes, or personal 
space; in the case of sex and love, to the most intimate parts and aspects 
of ourselves. What we do appear to have seen in the last few decades 
61. See e.g. UK, Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and 
Ethics of the Press by The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson: Report, 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2012) (concerns about press 
practices such as blagging and hacking led to the Leveson Inquiry as well 
as numerous civil cases against newspapers, most of which were settled).
62. In the UK the revelation of the bulk collection of communications data 
by the state led eventually to the decision in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Watson MP, [2018] EWCA Civ 70 finding the then 
regulations unlawful: they have been replaced with permanent, sweeping 
statutory powers under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. 
63. As in the leading UK decision of Campbell v MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22 
[Campbell]. 
64. See Nussbaum, supra note 44, for a range of extreme examples of self-
disclosure.
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is a shift in the relative value people give to privacy as state-of-being, 
compared to the value they attach to self-expression online as a means 
of connecting with people. Some people undoubtedly use social media 
to do this in a rather undifferentiated way: for example, seeking approval 
for their physical appearance from an online mass audience, instead of a 
few close friends.65 
However — and this is our key point — none of this means that 
people do not still value the right to privacy: they still want to decide 
what and how much they share — even if some use that choice to share 
far more with far more people than their parents would have dreamt of 
doing. A recent research project by the Pew Foundation found that “74% 
[of Americans] say it is ‘very important’ to them that they be in control of 
who can get information about them”.66 We see this in increasing concern 
and awareness about things like the “privacy settings” on Facebook,67 
how far people really give consent to the volume of information they 
are sharing with Google (which knows all the searches you’ve made) or 
Amazon or Kindle (which knows which of their books you have read); 
or Gmail, which has all the emails you’ve sent.68 Different people will 
always draw this boundary differently and that in itself is no cause of 
concern: in the “offline” world we will all know some people who are 
quite reserved — sharing aspects of their private life with only a few 
65. An extreme example is the phenomena of “ratings communities”, like 
“nonuglies”, where people post photos of themselves to be judged and 
rated by strangers. See Nussbaum, ibid, for these and other examples and 
e.g. <https://www.livejournal.com/blogs/en/nonuglies>.
66. Lee Rainie, “The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America” Pew Research 
Center (21 September 2016), online: Pew Research Center <www.
pewinternet.org/2014/12/18/future-of-privacy/>. While such control can 
be argued to have good consequences it can also be seen in deontological 
terms as an aspect of human dignity; for a classic account see Edward J 
Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser” (1964) 39:6 New York University Law Review 962. 
67. See e.g. Solove, “Speech, Privacy”, supra note 37 at 21, discussed supra 
note 58. 
68. For a recent major work on this subject see Neil Richards, Intellectual 
Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
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trusted friends — and others, who will drunkenly share intimate details 
of their love-lives with near-strangers. Privacy boundaries vary greatly 
between different societies; even within given societies, they will vary 
greatly between individuals and be drawn and re-drawn repeatedly. All 
that we can generalise is that it is a pervasive feature of human relations 
that, as Solove puts it, most people “reveal information to certain groups 
while keeping it from others”.69 
A key point therefore is that, while the boundaries between self-
expression and privacy will always vary between people and shift as 
society changes, none of that means that individuals should be deemed to 
have given up the core right to privacy — the claim that is, to exercise some 
control over access to their inner sphere, and particularly, their personal 
information. To argue that someone who chooses to share a great deal of 
their private information with others online, for that reason becomes fair 
game to have their private information taken from them without their 
consent, is a little like arguing that a woman who chooses to share her 
body intimately with many others by having numerous transitory sexual 
partners should lose her right to choose with whom she has sex.70 
That then is the core response to the argument that the proliferation 
of intimate personal information placed voluntarily online provides a 
reason against allowing legal claims for invasion of privacy when such 
information is used involuntarily. But there is a further point, also a 
well-known argument, but we think particularly apt in the case of social 
media. While the press and much scholarship, particularly from US 
First Amendment scholars, tends to portray privacy and self-expression 
as invariably in tension,71 they also go hand-in-hand. Privacy, as Fried 
has argued, is essential to the intimate communication vital to fostering 
69. Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the 
Information Age (New York: New York University Press, 2004) at 42–4. 
70. We do not of course suggest that the scale of violation in the two cases 
is comparable, merely the way in which, in both cases, past behaviour is 
used to justify dispensing with consent. 
71. See e.g. Diane Zimmerman, “Requiem for a Heavyweight: a Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort” (1983) 68:3 Cornell Law Review 
291; Richards, supra note 68. 
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close relationships: most of us will only share information that might be 
deeply painful or simply embarrassing with a friend or partner if we are 
reasonably sure that they will keep it to themselves; hence an assurance 
of privacy can actually ensure greater self-expression between people and 
thus greater intimacy.72 Online, this often translates into the need for 
anonymity, in which guise it facilitates individual self-exploration in the 
form of reading, watching and listening to a wide range of media often 
shared on social media, as well as blogging on intimate subjects. For 
example a deeply-conservative Evangelical Christian, seeking to explore 
his possible homosexuality is likely to do so online only if fairly sure 
that he can keep his explorations to himself. Exactly the same argument 
applies to the personal blogs that abound on the internet. This is what 
De Cew calls “expressive” privacy — “a realm for expressing one’s self-
identity or personhood”.73 This dimension of privacy then is crucial to 
individual self-development, exploration and self-actualisation: all values 
commonly argued to underlie free speech.74 
Thus as Mayer-Schönberger has pointed out, the purpose of the 
right to delete is to combat the loss of control an individual faces when 
their information and history — in a very real sense their personal 
identity — becomes, in Bernal’s words, “an indelible part of a mass 
of information usable and controllable by others”.75 However, the 
notion of a right to delete should also change the way the concept of 
informational autonomy is applied in privacy cases. Under the “old-
media” paradigm, previous self-publicity could be treated as a “waiver” 
72. See Charles Fried, “Privacy” (1968) 77:3 The Yale Law Journal 475; for a 
similar argument, see Jeffrey Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood” 
(1976) 6:1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 26. 
73. Judith W DeCew, “The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics” (1986) 5:2 
Law and Philosophy 145, at 166, also see 167–170.
74. For classic accounts see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical 
Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Kent 
Greenawalt, “Free Speech Justifications” (1989) 89:1 Columbia Law 
Review 119; Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) ch 1.
75. Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 206.
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of privacy rights,76 under which an individual’s prior decision to speak 
to the press about an aspect of their private life could lead to courts 
finding they had lost their previous reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Such loss could apply to the whole of their personal life (under the 
extreme notion of a “blanket waiver”) or just the same broad area (e.g. 
sex-life) that they had previously publicised.77 This approach comes close 
to treating informational autonomy as a one-off event: the individual 
gets to choose once whether to share certain personal information with 
a large audience. Then precisely because they made that choice, they are 
deemed to have lost the right to exercise it later. That approach always 
contradicted the premise of the informational autonomy model but it 
was one that media organisations successfully persuaded at least some 
courts to adopt. But the right to delete inescapably insists on a different 
approach, under which the right to control over personal information 
is not a one-off, but something that one can exercise continuously; thus, 
information one had previously publicised could still be the subject of a 
deletion claim. The notion that control is “waived” by self-publicity is 
necessarily rejected as incompatible with any meaningful right to delete. 
Thus, RTBF requires a shift in our understanding of informational self-
determination, from being (potentially) a one-off event, whereby control 
is exercised, but simultaneously lost for the future, to being instead a 
continuing entitlement. 
In short, privacy in a socially-networked world is about degrees of 
control over information about ourselves and determining the degree and 
nature of social interaction with others. If we lose that control we become 
76. See e.g. infra, text following note 256; for a critique of the concept of 
“waiver” see Gavin Phillipson, “Press Freedom, the Public Interest and 
Privacy” in Andrew Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation and Privacy 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016) at 150. In the US 
context, celebrities may be seen to have waived their right to privacy; 
thus giving media bodies a claim of “implied consent” to privacy claims 
brought against them: see e.g. John P Elwood, “Outing, Privacy and the 
First Amendment” (1992) 102:3 Yale Law Journal 747.
77. Known as the “zonal approach”: for examples, see e.g. Douglas v Hello!, 
[2003] 3 All ER 996 (CA) at para 226 (sex life) and A v B, [2005] 
EWHC 1651 (QB) (drug use).
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“powerless objects available for capture”, a mere “bundle of details, 
distortedly known, presumptuously categorised, instantly retrievable, 
and transferable to numerous unspecified parties at any time”’.78 The 
right to delete is part of the attempt to re-empower us online; all of us. 
Because, unlike classic tort privacy actions, which are typically available 
only to the wealthy celebrities who can afford them, RTBF is a remedy 
that anybody can use — hundreds of thousands have already.79 
III. The Right to be Forgotten: Key Interpretative 
Issues
A. The Focus of This Article 
This article considers RTBF only in relation to what we might broadly 
term online expression: by this we include traditional media online, such 
as newspaper and news websites, but also social media, search engines, 
blogs and all the other now-familiar aspects of Web 2.0. We are not 
therefore concerned with relatively uncontroversial aspects of RTBF, such 
as requiring the deletion of ordinary commercially-valuable personal data 
like contact details from a company whose services we previously used, or 
of personal data held by employers or public bodies, like health services 
and law-enforcement agencies. Nor, in relation to social media platforms 
will we consider what Keller terms “back-end data”, that is, data that 
online service providers (OSPs) themselves collect “by tracking their own 
users’ online behaviour”80 such as clicks, “likes”, etc., in order to target 
advertisements at them. As straightforward commercial data we do not 
treat this as an aspect of online expression (though it undoubtedly raises 
privacy concerns). Hence, when we discuss RTBF we are concerned only 
with its use in respect of data placed online by another individual or 
media body, whether the data subject themselves or a third party. Finally, 
78. Anne SY Cheung, “Rethinking Public Privacy in the Internet Era: A 
Study of Virtual Persecution by the Internet Crowd” (2009) 1:2 Journal 
of Media Law 191 at 210. See also Beate Rossler, The Value of Privacy, 
translated by RDV Glasgow (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) at 106. 
79. See above, at 3.
80. Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 4. 
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we are not concerned with scenarios in which an individual uploads their 
own personal information (such as photographs) to a social networking 
site like Facebook but retains first-hand control over it: since they are 
at liberty simply to delete it from the site (or even close their account 
completely),81 they would not need to invoke Article 17. However, if that 
data has subsequently been copied or shared such that it is now beyond 
the individual’s control, that takes us into scenarios that we do consider. 
B. Article 17 GDPR: The Basics
Article 17 gives the right to “data subjects” (an identifiable natural person 
to whom information online relates);82 it lies against “data controllers” 
— those who “alone or jointly with others, determine the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data”;83 this likely includes, 
for example, website hosts, authors of certain web-pages and search 
engines.84 “Processing” is very broadly defined and includes “collection … 
storage … retrieval … use … disclosure by transmission, dissemination 
or otherwise making available”85; hence it plainly encompasses the 
publication of personal data online, in whatever form. As discussed at 
various points below, the GDPR, in common with the earlier Directive, 
affords particular protection to what was previously known as “sensitive 
personal data”, now referred to as “special category data” (the former 
term will be used as the more intuitive match). This is defined in Article 
9(1) as personal data revealing:
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for 
the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or 
81. See Sophie Curtis, “How to permanently delete your Facebook account” 
The Telegraph (19 August 2015), online: The Telegraph <www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/facebook/11812145/How-to-permanently-delete-your-
Facebook-account.html>.
82. GDPR, supra note 1, art 4.
83. Ibid, art 4(4). 
84. Google Spain, supra note 4 (the CJEU found that Google was a data 
controller; the definition in GDPR, Article 4 is virtually the same as that 
considered in Google Spain). 
85. GDPR, supra note 1, art 4(2). 
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… a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.86
While Article 9(1) appears baldly to prohibit the processing of such data, 
there are broadly worded exceptions; these include the “explicit consent” 
of the data subject,87 where the data subject has “manifestly made the data 
public”88 and where: 
processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of 
Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, 
respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and 
specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the 
data subject.89 
The GDPR is a Regulation and, as such, automatically applicable across 
all EU states without the need for domestic implementation; however, 
its provisions specifically allow for Member States to supplement it 
by domestic laws,90 especially to provide exemptions to ensure proper 
protection for freedom of expression and information. Article 85(1) 
GDPR requires Member States “by law” to “reconcile the right to the 
protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to 
freedom of expression and information”.91 Article 85(2) more specifically 
states:
For processing carried out for journalistic purposes or the purpose of academic, 
artistic or literary expression, Member States shall provide for exemptions 
or derogations from [key provisions of the GDPR] if they are necessary to 
reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of 
86. Ibid, art 9(1). 
87. Ibid, art 9(2)(a).
88. Ibid, art 9(2)(e) (we are grateful to David Erdos for pointing out that the 
exception actually refers to data “which are manifestly made public” — 
the possible significance of this odd use of the present tense is considered 
further below at note 103). 
89. GDPR, supra note 1, art 9(2)(g). 
90. For a useful summary of these provisions see Daphne Keller, “The 
GDPR and National Legislation: Relevant Articles for Private Platform 
Adjudication of ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests” Inforrm (5 May 2017), 
online: Inforrm <https://inforrm.org/2017/05/05/the-gdpr-and-national-
legislation-relevant-articles-for-private-platform-adjudication-of-right-to-
be-forgotten-requests-daphne-keller/>. 
91. GDPR, supra note 1, art 85(1). 
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expression and information.92 
The UK has just passed such legislation,93 the Data Protection Act 
201894, which grants sweeping exemptions from the key requirements 
of the GDPR and the remedies it grants — including Article 17 — for 
processing, including of sensitive personal data, done in pursuit of “the 
special purposes”, including journalism.95 Many EU countries, however, 
had not passed any such legislation by the time this article went to press; 
hence the concrete effect of the GDPR will probably take many years 
to become apparent and considerable variation is likely to be found 
amongst the Member States. Since this article concerns the GDPR itself, 
rather than law in the UK, only brief mention will be made of the 2018 
Act, for illustrative purposes. 
Article 17, as material, provides:
(1) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the 
controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay 
where one of the following grounds applies: 
 (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based   
 … 96 and where there is no other legal ground for the processing;
92. Ibid, art 85(2). 
93. While the UK has decided to withdraw from the EU and will currently 
do so on 29 March 2019, it is legislating so as to retain the vast majority 
of currently applicable EU law in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018 (UK), c 16. While the bill specifies certain EU instruments that will 
not be retained, the GDPR is not one of them. 
94. The Data Protection Act 2018 (UK), c 12 [2018 Act].
95. See below, at 34. 
96. GDPR, supra note 1 (the provision refers both to consent under Article 
6(1) to the processing of “ordinary personal data” and “explicit consent” 
under Article 9(1) to the processing of “sensitive personal data”). 
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 (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1)97   
 and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, 
 (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; …
 (f ) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of   
 information society services referred to in Article 8(1).98 … 
(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is necessary:
 (a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information … 
It also contains a requirement for controllers to inform third parties who 
are processing the same data that it has been requested for deletion under 
Article 17(2).99 As will be seen, the right is broadly framed, and does 
not appear to require any threshold of seriousness to be met in order to 
invoke it.100 Given the reference to withdrawing consent, Article 17 may 
apply to information initially uploaded by the data subject themselves as 
well as that uploaded by a third party. As Recital 65 makes clear: 
97. The right to object referred to is objection to processing “necessary for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by 
a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child” 
see GDPR, ibid, art 6(1)(f ).
98. This means essentially that the information was collected from a child and 
they or their parents consented at the time (children may only consent 
from the age of 13 on). “Information society services” are defined as “any 
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of 
electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) 
and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a 
service” see GDPR, ibid, art 8(1). They include online shops, streaming 
services and social media, see GDPR, ibid, art 4(25).
99. GDPR, ibid, art 17(2) provides: “Where the controller has made the 
personal data public and is obliged … to erase [it], the controller, taking 
account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall 
take reasonable steps … to inform controllers which are processing the 
personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such 
controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data”. 
100. As opposed to, for example, a defamation claim brought in English law 
under the Defamation Act 2013, (UK) c 26 (see section 1). 
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[T]he right is relevant in particular where the data subject has given his or her 
consent as a child and is not fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, 
and later wants to remove such personal data, especially on the internet. The 
data subject should be able to exercise that right notwithstanding the fact that 
he or she is no longer a child.101
The ability to use the right to delete in order to leave behind embarrassing 
childhood images or posts is one of the more widely-accepted aspects of 
RTBF. It should be noted that, in the case of material that was uploaded 
by the data subject as an adult, withdrawal of consent grounds a claim 
only where the previous consent of the data subject was the sole lawful 
basis for processing the data.102 Thus for “ordinary data”, the controller 
could rely instead on their “legitimate interests” (unless overridden by the 
privacy interests of the data subject) as a lawful basis for processing. If the 
data is “sensitive” within the meaning of Article 9, the controller could 
seek to rely on a deliberate decision by the data subject to make the data 
public103 in the past, such as posting it to a public website as the basis. If 
this condition was found to be made out, then withdrawal of consent per 
se would not appear to ground a deletion request.
Finally, and very importantly, Article 17 makes clear that, even where 
paragraph (1) is satisfied, the right is only prima facie made out: it must 
then be balanced against freedom of expression of either or both of the 
data controller and (if the two are not the same) the original poster of the 
101. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 65.
102. Ibid, art 17(1)(b).
103. GDPR, ibid, art 9(2)(e). As noted above, supra note 88, the wording of 
the GDPR refers to data “which are manifestly made public”. In the UK 
context, the 2018 Act, supra note 94, s 86(2) states that the processing 
of sensitive personal data “is only lawful” if “at least one condition” from 
both Schedule 9 and Schedule 10 is fulfilled. In many cases involving 
online expression the only likely condition that could be relied on in 
Schedule 10 is para 5: “The information contained in the personal data 
has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data 
subject” [emphasis added]. Evidently the effect of the UK legislation here 
might be different from the GDPR provision. How this situation would 
be resolved in other member states might turn on the particular terms of 
their own GDPR legislation. 
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data.104 On the face of it, it appears therefore that freedom of expression 
could be invoked to refuse deletion as a particular remedy, even where 
the data being requested for deletion is being processed unlawfully. 
This might arise, for example, where the data requested for deletion is 
“sensitive” and there is no legal basis for processing it.105 
C. Some Key Interpretive Dilemmas
As noted above, the GDPR leaves a number of extremely important 
issues unclear. Three in particular stand out: first, will private individuals 
uploading information about others online be classed as data controllers 
and hence subject to RTBF requests? Second, will social media platforms 
publishing such third-party content be controllers (often referred to as 
the “intermediary liability” issue)? And third, who will benefit from the 
broad exemption for “journalism”? As these issues are canvassed in detail 
elsewhere;106 only a relatively brief account is offered here. 
1. Can Individuals Using Social Media be Data 
Controllers? 
We consider first the possible liability of individuals. Many might bridle 
at the notion that we “process the personal data” of others; however, most 
of us do it all the time. A very common scenario involves an individual 
104. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(3)(a).
105. We are indebted to David Erdos for pointing this out. 
106. On the intermediary liability question see Keller, “Right Tools”, supra 
note 5, and Erdos, “Intermediary Publishers”, supra note 6; on the issue of 
individuals as possible data controllers see David Erdos, “Beyond ‘Having 
a Domestic’? Regulatory Interpretation of European Data Protection Law 
and Individual Publication” (2017) 33:3 Computer Law and Security 
Review 275 [Erdos, “Domestic”]: Brendan V Alsenoy, “The Evolving 
Role of the Individual Under EU Data Protection Law” (2015) CiTiP 
Working Paper 23/2015, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2641680>; on the scope of the journalist exemption 
see above Erdos, “Domestic” and David Erdos, “From the Scylla of 
Restriction to the Charybdis of License? Exploring the Present and Future 
Scope of the ‘Special Purposes’ Freedom of Expression Shield in European 
Data Protection” (2015) 52:1 Common Market Law Review 119. 
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posting a photograph of a friend or family member, often showing the 
two of them together. If the post included a comment such as “Annabel 
had a bad dose of flu but still looked great!” then the poster has processed 
sensitive personal data about another. So, in scenarios like these, will the 
poster be counted, at least for some purposes, as a “data controller”? The 
so-called “household” exemption in the GDPR is the starting point. 
This provides that the Regulation “does not apply to the processing of 
personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity”.107 Recital 18 explains that this means processing 
“with no connection to a professional or commercial activity”108 and that 
such processing “could include … social networking and online activity 
undertaken within the context of such activities”.109 Research by David 
Erdos on the attitude of national Data Protection Authorities (“DPAs”) 
across the EU showed wide variation in their approach to this issue; 
however, a common theme was that a key distinction was to be drawn 
between publication to a small, controlled group — likely to fall within 
the “household exemption” — and publication to an indefinite group, 
which would not. As Erdos puts it:
The vast majority [of ]… DPAs hold that once personal information relating to 
somebody other than the publisher themselves is disseminated to an indefinite 
number, the personal exemption cannot apply.110
It appears that this is based on the decision of the CJEU in Lindqvist,111 
interpreting an almost identical exempting provision in the previous 
1995 Data Protection Directive. In that case, the Court said that the 
exemption was confined: 
only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of 
individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data 
consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible 
to an indefinite number of people.112
107. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 18. 
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid [emphasis added]. 
110. Erdos, “Domestic” supra note 106 at 276. 
111. Lindqvist, supra note 20. 
112. Ibid at para 47.
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This approach has been echoed by the EU’s Article 29 Working Party 
(“Working Party”)113, which in 2013 said: “[i]f a user takes an informed 
decision to extend access beyond self-selected ‘friends’, data controller 
responsibilities come into force”.114 Thus under our scenario of posting 
a photo of Annabel, the crucial factor would be the privacy settings the 
poster was using: provided the photo was posted only to a closed group 
of “friends”, the Household exemption would likely apply, meaning the 
GDPR would not. However, if it were posted to a public forum — as in 
a Facebook post made available to all, or a tweet — then the individual 
would become a data controller in respect of that item. 
Erdos notes further that some DPAs took a more “stringent 
approach” suggesting that, in general, use of others’ personal data on 
social networking sites should require data subject consent.115 Conversely, 
one of the most permissive DPAs was the UK’s Authority, which said that 
the personal exemption would apply: 
whenever someone uses an online forum purely in a personal capacity for their 
own domestic or recreational purposes; [hence it] will not consider complaints 
made against individuals who have posted personal data whilst acting in a 
113. Directive, supra note 1, art 29 established a Working Party on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data (“the Working Party”). In the first UK case of a Google Spain-style 
delisting that reached the courts, Warby J in the High Court said: “All 
parties are agreed that [Guidance by the Working Party on Google Spain] 
will be of the greatest use to me in assessing the claims” see NT1 and NT2 
v Google, [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at para 39 [NT1].
114. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on Online 
Social Networking, (2009) 01189/09/EN (WP163) at 6. A subsequent 
report in 2013 suggested that such a factor should not be determinative 
but only be “an important consideration” amongst many see Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, Statement of the Working Party on Current 
Discussions Regarding the Data Protection Reform Package, (2013) Annex 
2: Proposals for Amendments Regarding Exemption for Personal or 
Household Activities at 9; but by 2015 the Working Party had seemingly 
returned to advocating only a narrow limitation see Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Appendix: Core Topics in View of the Trilogue, 
(2015) Annex to the letters at 3. 
115. Erdos, “Domestic”, supra note 106 at 286. This group had 11 DPAs 
including from Norway, Germany, France, and Belgium. 
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personal capacity, no matter how unfair, derogatory or distressing the posts 
may be.116 
Erdos’s own view suggests a more qualitative analysis whereby:
the interpretation of the personal exemption should be widened to encompass 
those forms of individual publication which do not pose a serious prima facie 
risk of infringing … the core privacy, reputation and related rights which data 
protection is dedicated to safeguard.117 
He suggests three situations in which such a risk would be present: (a) 
“clearly pejorative posts” (e.g. a student critiquing a particular teacher 
by name); (b) “disclosure of private details re private life (especially 
if sensitive)” or (c) comments that are “so frequent and focused” that 
they amount to harassment.118 We argue below that in making such a 
qualitative assessment, guidance from the Strasbourg Court could play 
a useful role. 
In short then, it is not possible to be sure either about the correct 
interpretation of the GDPR in this respect, or the practice of national 
DPAs with primary responsibility for enforcing it. It is likely that the 
major variations in approach identified by Erdos will continue for several 
years, at least until authoritative and detailed guidance is obtained from 
the CJEU or the new European Data Protection Board.119 
2. Intermediary Liability
What then of the social media platforms themselves? Keller points out 
how a request by another for Twitter to erase a tweet that Keller had 
written:
affects at least four key sets of rights: my rights to free expression, [the data 
subject’s] rights to Data Protection and privacy, other Internet users’ rights to 
116. UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Social networking and online 
forums – when does the DPA apply? (2014), at 15 online: ICO <https://ico.
org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1600/social-networking-and-
online-forums-dpa-guidance.pdf>.
117. Erdos, “Domestic”, supra note 106 at 276, 292. 
118. Ibid at 292. 
119. Established under GDPR, supra note 1, art 68, and tasked with, inter alia, 
providing best practice guidance regarding deletion requests see GDPR, 
supra note 1, art 71(1)(d). 
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seek and access information, and Twitter’s rights as a business.120
It is important to note, that in EU law, the liability of such “hosts” for third 
party content that is (for example) in breach of copyright, is governed by 
the E-Commerce Directive;121 this, broadly, shields hosts from liability in 
respect of such content in the absence of knowledge of its unlawfulness. 
However, despite some suggestions to the contrary122 it seems tolerably 
clear that this regime will not apply to data protection claims123 and that 
the GDPR will. The starting point is GDPR Recital 18, which, having 
granted the exemption for “purely personal”, or “household” processing, 
immediately goes on: “this Regulation applies to controllers or processors 
which provide the means for processing personal data for such personal 
or household activities”.124 The Working Party in a recent opinion argued 
that both the social networks and the original poster would be data 
controllers in relation to material posted by users.125 Erdos thinks it is 
clear that social media platforms like Facebook126 will be data controllers; 
this would be consistent with the E-Commerce Directive, he contends, 
as the primary obligations will be ex-post obligations to remove data once 
their attention is drawn to it (including the right to delete). This, he 
120. Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 18–19. 
121. EC, Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, [2008] 
OJ, L-178 [E-Commerce Directive].
122. Especially by Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5. 
123. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 121, recital 14, seems decisive here: 
“The protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data is solely governed by [laws including the 1995 Directive, supra 
note 1], which are fully applicable to information society services; these 
Directives already establish a Community legal framework in the field of 
personal data and therefore it is not necessary to cover this issue in this 
Directive”.
124. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 18. 
125. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts 
of “Controller” and “Processor”, (2010) 00264/10/EN (WP 169) online: 
<www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88016.pdf>.
126. Found by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland to be a data controller 
under the 1995 Directive, supra note 1 see CG v Facebook Ireland Ltd, 
[2016] NICA 54. 
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argues, would not fall foul of the prohibition of obligations to engage in 
general monitoring in the Directive.127
Keller seeks to avoid the conclusion that, since we know from Google 
Spain that search engines are data controllers, platforms like Facebook 
must be too. She points out that the finding in Google Spain was justified 
by particular reasoning: that the search engine produces a “structured 
overview” of “vast aspects of [the data subject’s] private life … which, 
without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could 
have been only with great difficulty”.128 Keller then argues from this that 
social media platforms have a lesser impact on an individual’s privacy, 
while deleting actual content (instead of merely de-listing it) would 
have a greater effect on freedom of expression; hence this sufficiently 
distinguishes social media platforms from search engines.129 However, 
these arguments are probably best taken as arguing for a higher burden 
on those seeking to delete content, rather than merely de-list: she argues 
that “it should be harder to get content removed from a hosting platform, 
because the balance of rights and interests is different”.130 This is right in 
part: in general, removing content as opposed to simply delisting it when 
searched under an individual’s name will be a greater interference with 
freedom of expression. Moreover (but also only in general) search engines 
can have a particularly serious impact on privacy, for the reasons she 
gives. The key point, however, is that this would not necessarily always 
be the case: as argued below, the extent to which a given piece of online 
content compromises a person’s privacy depends upon a multi-factor 
assessment, in which perhaps the most important factor is the nature of 
the information itself.
Two pairs of examples will illustrate the point. Celebrity A is seeking 
to have Google de-link to some mildly embarrassing gossip-journalism 
reports about her excessive drinking one evening several years ago. 
Celebrity B in contrast wants Facebook to remove a post by an estranged 
friend revealing details of B’s past struggles with a serious eating disorder. 
127.  Erdos, “Intermediary Publishers”, supra note 6.
128.  Google Spain, supra note 4 at para 80. 
129.  Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 36. 
130. Ibid at 43 [emphasis in original]. 
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Here it seems clear that Celebrity B has a far stronger and more serious 
privacy claim, not least because her case deals with one of the classes 
of sensitive data.131 That then demonstrates that claims against hosts 
can raise much more weighty privacy interests than those against search 
engines. 
The second pair of examples considers the freedom of expression side 
of the balance. Politician C is seeking, shortly before an election, to have 
Google immediately remove from search returns (pending investigation) 
links to stories detailing truthful allegations of misconduct during a 
previous election.132 Celebrity D is seeking to have topless photographs 
hacked from her iCloud account removed from a Tumblr site. In this 
case, although D is seeking to have actual content removed and C merely 
to have it de-listed, it is clear beyond argument that Google would have 
a far stronger claim under the freedom of expression derogation than 
Tumblr: political expression is invariably treated by Strasbourg as the 
“highest value” speech.133 
Keller’s broad-brush comparison of search engines with social media 
platforms, therefore, only takes us so far: while the former may in general 
pose a greater threat to privacy but have a weaker free speech claim, it 
is not hard to generate examples where both propositions are decisively 
reversed. The conclusion, therefore, seems clear: in each case, a court or 
regulator would have to treat the status of the data controller (search 
131. Namely information relating to health see GDPR, supra note 1, art 9(1). 
132. An example along these lines is actually used by Keller to show the 
potentially draconian effect of a right to restrict processing under Article 
18 (i.e. pulling the item offline), pending investigation as to whether e.g. 
the data is inaccurate: Keller, “Right Tools”, supra note 5 at 40. 
133. See e.g. Von Hannover, supra note 25 (“[t]he Court considers that a 
fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts . . . 
capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, relating to 
politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting 
details of the private life of an individual who … does not exercise official 
functions. While in the former case the press exercises its vital role of 
‘watchdog’ in a democracy by contributing to ‘impart[ing] information 
and ideas on matters of public interest . . . it does not do so in the latter 
case” at para 63). 
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engine or host) as but one factor amongst many in weighing the strength 
of the RTBF claim. 
3. Reliance on the Journalism Exemption or Freedom of 
Expression
The final issue concerns the ability of bodies like Facebook, Twitter and 
private individuals to claim either the “special purposes” journalism 
exemption or their own freedom of expression as a defence to RBTF 
claims. As noted above,134 the GDPR provides in Article 85 for Member 
States to legislate to provide specific exemptions for freedom of expression 
and the special purposes. The UK’s legislation for this purpose, the Data 
Protection Act 2018, provides a sweeping exemption: the requirements of 
lawful processing and the other data protection principles, together with 
all the key rights of the data subject (including Article 17), do not apply 
where: 
(2) (a) the processing is being carried out with a view to the publication by   
 a person of journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material; 
 (b) the controller reasonably believes that the publication of the material  
 would be in the public interest; 
(3) The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to the extent that the controller 
reasonably believes that the application of those provisions would be 
incompatible with the special purposes; 
(4) In determining whether publication would be in the public interest the 
controller must take into account the special importance of the public interest 
in the freedom of expression and information.135
This is a very broad exemption,136 though much will depend on its 
134. See above, at 23–24. 
135. 2018 Act, supra note 94, schedule 2, paras 26(2)–(4). 
136. It is in substance the same (with the addition of “academic purposes”) as 
the exemption provided in the previous Data Protection Act 1998 (UK), c 
29, which implemented the previous Directive, 1995 Directive, supra note 
1. 
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interpretation.137 The first question is who will fall within it. In Google 
Spain, the CJEU said that “the processing carried out by the operator of a 
search engine”138 did not appear to fall within the journalism exemption; 
Google was not able to rely on it. The English High Court, in the first 
Google Spain-style case heard in the UK,139 followed this, finding that 
Google acts:
for a commercial purpose which, however valuable it may be, is not undertaken 
for any of the special purposes, or “with a view to” the publication by others of 
journalistic material. Such processing is undertaken for Google’s own purposes 
which are of a separate and distinct nature.140
What then of operators like Facebook and Twitter? Notably in Google 
Spain, the CJEU, in the same paragraph as that cited above, said that “the 
processing by the publisher of a web page consisting in the publication 
of information relating to an individual may … be carried out ‘solely for 
journalistic purposes’ and thus fall within the journalism exemption”.141 
In a more recent decision the CJEU said that activities: 
may be classified as ‘journalistic activities’ if their object is the disclosure to the 
public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is 
used to transmit them. They are not limited to media undertakings and may 
be undertaken for profit–making purposes.142
The importance of intermediaries was recognised by the Advocate 
General in Google Spain, who said that they “act as bridge builders 
between content providers and internet users … ” thus playing a role 
that “has been considered as crucial for the information society”.143 Also 
137. Courts are likely to follow the interpretation given to the very similar 
provision in the 1998 Act: see e.g. Campbell v MGN, [2002] EMLR 30 
(CA (Eng)) at para 85, confirming that actual publication of newspapers 
(online and in hard copy) as well as processing with a view to publication 
falls within the exemption. 
138. Google Spain, supra note 4 at para 85. 
139. NT1, supra note 113.
140. Ibid at para 100. 
141. Google Spain, supra note 4, at para 85. 
142. Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, 
C-73/07, [2008] ECR I-09831 at para 61. 
143. Google Spain, supra note 4 at para 36. 
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of relevance here is Recital 153 of the GDPR, which provides:
In order to take account of the importance of the right to freedom of expression 
in every democratic society, it is necessary to interpret notions relating to that 
freedom, such as journalism, broadly.144 
This is in line with the definition of “journalist” given by the Council 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, quoted with approval in a recent 
Strasbourg judgment as being “any natural or legal person who [was] 
regularly or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination 
of information to the public via any means of mass communication”.145 
All of the above would appear to support the notion that at least some 
content appearing on Facebook, Twitter and the like, could be considered 
journalism, even where not published by professional journalists. But 
however broadly and flexibly the notion is interpreted it would seem 
highly unlikely that it could cover all kinds of content: As the High 
Court in the English Google146 case put it: 
[T]he concept is not so elastic that it can be stretched to embrace every activity 
that has to do with conveying information or opinions. To label all such 
activity as “journalism” would be to elide the concept of journalism with that 
of communication.147
Erdos notes that many national DPAs hold that the special purposes 
derogation “only protects forms of expression undertaken by individuals 
which are patently akin to that of professional journalism”.148 Even the 
extensive definition of the Council of Ministers just quoted would confine 
it to persons regularly engaged in “the dissemination of information to 
the public”.149 This could, for example, include someone who regularly 
uses Twitter or Facebook to post information about and comment on 
issues of the day; it would not cover someone simply posting pictures of, 
e.g., a relative’s baby. Erdos comments that: 
In referring to special purposes rather than special actors, [the definition in the 
144. GDPR, supra note 1, recital 153 [emphasis added]. 
145. Satakunnan, supra note 60 at para 118.
146. NT1, supra note 113. 
147. Ibid at para 98. 
148. Erdos, “Domestic”, supra note 106 at 276.
149. Satakunnan, supra note 60 at para 118. 
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GDPR] is not restricted to professional journalists, artists and academic or 
non–academic writers but rather is in principle open to everyone (a reality 
given emphasis by the CJEU in Satamedia) including private individuals.150
And he argues that:
[T]he GDPR’s apparent removal of the [previous] requirement that processing 
be conceptualised as “solely” for the special expressive purposes as well its 
general emphasis on construing this clause “broadly” [Recital 153] provides an 
opportunity to decisively reject … prioritisation of expression by actors with a 
particular professional status.151 
He, therefore, concludes that the journalism exemption should cover 
“individuals disseminating a message to the collective public”152 but that 
it will probably not cover those engaging merely with “self expression” 
and the “linked general freedom to converse”.153 
If this is right, then courts and regulators will, over time, have to 
engage in the extremely difficult task of classifying certain content on 
Twitter and Facebook as posted for journalistic purposes (e.g. comments 
on politics and current affairs), and some as not (e.g. family pictures). 
If the content is classified as falling within the “journalistic purposes” 
exemption, there would seem no good reason to hold that the individual 
poster can claim the journalism exemption but that the host (Facebook, 
Twitter) could not. Even if a court were minded to make this distinction 
it would make no difference in practice: if only the individual poster was 
classified as falling within the journalism exemption, a RTBF claim made 
against Facebook, for example, could be resisted on the basis that the 
disputed content fell within the purposes of journalism, seen from the 
perspective of the original poster. 
Finally, even where content is not considered journalism, a host 
(or individual user) could still resist an Article 17 request on the basis 
that “the processing was necessary for exercising the right of freedom of 
expression”154 of the original poster. The CJEU has said consistently, as far 
150. Ibid at 289. 
151. Ibid at 290. 
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(3)(a).
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back as the Lindqvist case, that both data protection authorities and courts 
have a duty in certain cases outside of the special purposes exemption to 
interpret data protection rules with regard for freedom of expression.155 
How far eventual interpretation of the GDPR will privilege journalistic 
purposes over the freedom of expression of ordinary members of the 
public remains at present a matter of speculation. Much may depend on 
the particular legislation introduced by national Parliaments,156 as well as 
the policies and guidance of national DPAs. What also remains to be seen 
is how far intermediaries like Facebook and Twitter will go in seeking 
to defend the freedom of expression of its individual users, given that 
the original posters of material will not, seemingly be involved at all in 
decisions on whether to remove the content pursuant to deletion requests. 
This is something that Keller argues is a major structural problem with 
155. Lindqvist, supra note 20 at para 87.
156. The sweeping exemption granted by the UK’s Data Protection Act 2018, 
supra note 94, only applies to “special purposes” material, but broader 
exemptions to protect freedom of expression and information may 
subsequently be introduced by UK Regulation made under section 16. 
Section 16(1)(c) gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations for 
the purposes of the power in Article 85(2) to provide for exemptions or 
derogations from certain parts of the GDPR where necessary to reconcile 
the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and 
information. These will likely be similar to the terms of the previous Data 
Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000 (UK), 2000 
no 417, which the 2018 Act revoked (per Schedule 19). 
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RTBF under European data protection law.157
IV. A Possible Role for Article 8 ECHR? 
Article 17 is a new and broadly-framed provision and offers little 
guidance as to its proper interpretation, in particular how the tension 
it creates with freedom of expression, should be resolved. The Working 
Party’s guidance on Google Spain said that, “in determining the balance” 
between data protection rights and freedom of expression, “the case-
law of the European Court on Human Rights is especially relevant”.158 
Hence the remainder of this paper will consider how far the Strasbourg’s 
Article 8 privacy jurisprudence may guide interpretation of Article 17, an 
analysis not yet attempted in the literature. It will do so by elucidating 
principles from that jurisprudence, and considering whether they are 
either: (a) applicable to the interpretation of the right to be forgotten; (b) 
applicable but with modification; or (c) inapplicable.
157. Daphne Keller, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ and National Laws Under 
the GDPR” Inforrm (4 May 2017), online: Inforrm <https://inforrm.
org/2017/05/04/the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-national-laws-under-
the-gdpr-daphne-keller> (Keller discusses in detail a number of serious 
issues concerning procedural fairness relating to the handling of RTBF 
requests under Article 17: she points out that the original speaker who 
provided the content (e.g. the author of a Tweet) will not be represented 
during the decision of a host (or search engine) as to whether to remove 
(or delist) the content, which, she argues, “puts a very heavy thumb on 
the scales against the [speaker]” at para 15. She also points out that, while 
data subjects can appeal a refusal to delete to the DPA, and ultimately 
to the courts, there are “no public correction mechanism for cases where 
Google actually should de-list less [emphasis in original]” (ibid, para 18). 
Finally, in “Right Tools”, supra note 5, Keller highlights that in most cases, 
online service providers are not even allowed to tell the accused user that 
her content has been de-listed or erased. This, she argues, “places the fate 
of online expression in the hands of accusers and technology companies 
– neither of whom has sufficient incentive to stand up for the speaker’s 
rights” at para 48).
158. Article 29 Google Spain Guidelines, supra note 6 at 14.
40 
 
Brimblecombe & Phillipson, Regaining Digital Privacy?
A. The General Relevance of Strasbourg Case Law 
It is clear beyond argument that Strasbourg jurisprudence will be relevant 
to the interpretation of the GDPR. Article 52(3) of the EU Charter states 
that when Charter and ECHR rights overlap the ECHR’s definition (in 
effect, Strasbourg’s interpretation) of the right should be taken to be 
the same as that of the corresponding provision within the Charter.159 
In other words Charter rights must be interpreted consistently with 
ECHR rights that correspond to them and are thus “complementary” 
to the ECHR rights.160 Since the right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR 
corresponds with Article 7 of the EU Charter,161 Strasbourg jurisprudence 
is directly relevant to the CJEU and European courts’ formulation of 
Article 17. This is enhanced by the long-standing inter-court comity 
between the CJEU and Strasbourg. Both courts regularly cite each 
other’s judgments,162 in many cases the CJEU taking Strasbourg’s more 
experienced lead when adjudicating upon fundamental rights.163 Over 
the course of the last decade a strong working relationship between the 
two courts has been fostered.164Further, the “Bosphorus presumption”, 
whereby Strasbourg operates a rebuttable presumption that EU law offers 
159. EU Charter, supra note 21, art 52(3); see Wolfgang Weib, “Human Rights 
in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human 
Rights After Lisbon” (2011) 7:1 European Constitutional Law Review 64 
at 64–67. 
160. Tommaso Pavone, “The Past and Future Relationship of the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: A Functional 
Analysis” Social Science Research Network (28 May 2012) at 13, online: 
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2042867>. 
161. EU Charter, supra note 21. 
162. Noreen O’Meara, “‘A More Secure Europe of Rights?’ The European 
Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
EU Accession to the ECHR” (2011) 12:10 German Law Journal 1813 at 
1815. 
163. Pavone, supra note 160 at 1. 
164. O’Meara, supra note 162 at 1816. See also Sylvia de Vries, “EU and 
ECHR: Conflict or Harmony?” (2013) 9:1 Utrecht Law Review 78 at 79 
(it has been said that lines are becoming “increasingly blurred” between 
rights protection afforded between the ECtHR and the CJEU).
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rights protection at least equivalent to that of the ECHR, shows the 
privileged nature of EU law at Strasbourg. Overall, the strong structural 
relationship between the two courts165 means that Strasbourg case law 
is likely to have a significant influence on the interpretation of the EU’s 
new data protection framework. 
B. How Strasbourg’s Article 8 Jurisprudence Might 
Apply
Strasbourg has developed the test of whether a claimant had a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” (“REP”) in order to decide Article 8 claims in a 
plethora of cases, including Halford v UK,166 PG & JH v UK,167 Peck v 
UK,168 Perry v UK169 and more recently Von Hannover v Germany (nos 1, 
2 & 3)170 and Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v Norway.171 In deciding whether 
such an expectation arises, Strasbourg uses the factors discussed in Part 
V below. If a REP is not established, the claim fails; if it is, the court 
proceeds to balance the Article 8 claim against the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10; in doing so it will often return to the same 
165. Which will be strengthened further once the planned accession of the 
EU to the ECHR goes ahead, as required by the EC, Treaty of Lisbon 
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, [2007] OJ, C-306/01, art 6(2). The process is 
currently stalled but see e.g. Christina Eckes, “EU Accession to the 
ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaption” (2013) 76:2 Modern 
Law Review 254; Tobias Lock, “The Future of the European Union’s 
Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 
2/13: Is it Still Possible and is it Still Desirable?” (2015) 11:2 European 
Constitutional Law Review 239.
166. Halford v United Kingdom, No 20605/92, [1997] 24 EHRR 523.
167. PG and JH v United Kingdom, No 44787/98, [2001] IX ECHR 195 
[PG]. 
168. Peck v United Kingdom, No 44647/98, [2003] I ECHR 123 [Peck].
169. Perry v United Kingdom, No 63737/00, [2003] IX ECHR 141 [Perry].
170. Von Hannover, supra note 25; Von Hannover v Germany (no 2), No 
40660/08 [2012] I ECHR 399 [Von Hannover no 2]; Von Hannover v 
Germany (no 3), No 8772/10, [2013] V ECHR 264 [Von Hannover no 3].
171. Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v Norway, No 13258/09, [2014] ECHR 59 
[Lillo-Stenberg].
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factors in order to consider the weight of the privacy claim.172 There are 
several different possibilities as to how courts and regulators in Europe 
might use elements of the REP test to guide their interpretation of 
Article 17. Different national courts may, at least for some time, produce 
different interpretations of this relationship, which will remain until 
authoritative guidance is provided by the CJEU or the new EU Data 
Protection Board, which will take time. Moreover, given that the GDPR 
specifically allows national legislatures to flesh out aspects of the new 
regime via national law, there is room for divergent national approaches 
to flourish permanently, as indeed happened under the previous EU data 
protection scheme.173 There is also the intriguing possibility of a clash 
between the GDPR and the European Convention on Human Rights: a 
claim could be brought to the Strasbourg court that a particular ruling 
under Article 17 by a national court violates the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10.174 
There are a number of possible approaches that courts and Regulators 
might take to the relevance of Strasbourg’s REP test to Article 17. These 
include: 
1. Determining that the deletion right only applies where the data 
172. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, “Defining ‘Private Life’ Under Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by Referring to 
Reasonable Expectations” (2005) 35:2 California Western International 
Law Journal 153, online: CWILJ <https://scholarlycommons.
law.cwsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.
ca/&httpsredir=1&article=1164&context=cwilj>.
173. David Erdos made the first systematic study of national laws 
implementing Directive 95/46 in terms of the protection they provided 
for media freedom: see David Erdos, “European Union Data Protection 
Law and Media Expression: Fundamentally Off Balance” (2016) 65:1 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 139 (he found “a total lack 
of even minimal harmonisation” (abstract) and, in different member states 
“outcomes ranging from subjecting the media to entirely inappropriate 
peremptory rules to completely eliminating the individual’s substantive 
data protection rights when they come into conflict with media 
expression” at 180).
174. Satakunnan, supra note 60, concerned such an unsuccessful claim 
(although not of course in relation to the GDPR). 
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subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This would seem 
an implausibly restrictive interpretation of Article 17, but one 
that media bodies, including social media companies, may seek 
to argue before national courts and regulators.
2. Treating the REP test as wholly irrelevant to the right to be 
forgotten; given the Working Party’s clear view of the importance 
of the Strasbourg jurisprudence175 this seems unlikely. 
3. Using the REP factors only in order to reconcile an erasure claim 
under Article 17 with the freedom of expression exception.176 
4. Using the test or factors from it to assist in determining whether 
RTBF would apply only in doubtful or borderline situations, 
where the deletion request was particularly contentious in some 
way. In particular, consideration of factors derived from the REP 
test could help resolve:
• the scope of the household exemption;177 
• in relation to “sensitive” data, whether the individual had 
deliberately made it public;178 
• whether and when hosts should be fixed with liability as 
data controllers;179 
• where the deletion request is made on the basis of the data 
subject’s objection to processing being carried out “for 
the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data 
controller or a third party”, determining which interests 
can be outweighed by “the interests or fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject”.180 Factors from the REP 
test could help determine how strongly those interests are 
175. Above, at 39.
176. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(3)(a).
177. Discussed above, Part III.C.1. 
178. GDPR, supra note 1, art 9(2)(e) (such a finding could ground an 
alternative basis for processing other than consent — which may be 
withdrawn under Article 9). 
179. Recalling that in Google Spain, supra note 4, the CJEU decided that 
Google should be treated as a data controller partly because of the serious 
impact that its activities could have on the data subject’s privacy.
180. GDPR, supra note 1, art 6(1)(f ). 
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engaged; and
• the overall balance of a RTBF request with freedom of 
expression and/or the purposes of journalism. 
At this point it will be helpful to give examples of different ways in which 
personal data may be disseminated online; these may affect the balance 
between expression and privacy rights and hence how the principles 
employed by the Strasbourg Court in adjudicating Article 8 claims may 
apply to the right to erasure. 
1. Data Dissemination Scenarios
i. Information concerning a data subject (“A”) is uploaded 
by a third party (“B”) without A’s consent (the “third party  
scenario”)
Personal data placed online in this manner directly parallels traditional 
Article 8 claims considered in the Strasbourg case law. Nearly all its 
privacy jurisprudence concerns non-consensual publication of personal 
information by a third party, often the press, as in key cases like Von 
Hannover181 and a more recent decision in which a celebrity couple 
complained of covert photographs of them published by a Norwegian 
magazine.182 In such scenarios, Strasbourg principles pertaining to the 
weight of the Article 8 claim could be directly “read across” to Article 17 
cases. Strasbourg has made clear that the processing of personal data by an 
external actor that creates a permanent record of an event is a significant 
consideration in determining whether a REP exists.183 Indeed Strasbourg 
has appeared willing to find a breach of Article 8 in relation to personal 
data merely stored by a third party against a subject’s wishes.184 Such 
storage will often be a significantly less serious breach of privacy than the 
dissemination of personal data online, as would be the case with a claim 
under Article 17 of the GDPR. If European courts take Strasbourg’s lead 
181. Von Hannover, supra note 25. 
182. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171.
183. PG, supra note 167.
184. Amann v Switzerland, No 27798/95, [2000] II ECHR 245 at para 70. 
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in this regard this would tend to give Article 17 a wide ambit.185 
ii. A data subject (“A”) made personal data available online; it is 
reposted without consent to third party sites and A wishes to 
delete it (the “data leak” scenario) 
A crucial factor here will be whether the initial posting was (a) to a 
restricted forum (e.g. a controlled group of Facebook “friends”); or (b) 
to the world at large (e.g. on Twitter or to “the public” on Facebook).186 
The Strasbourg case law can be readily used to support an expectation 
of privacy in scenario (a), provided that the data subject could not have 
reasonably foreseen that the information would be viewed by such a large 
audience.187 There are obvious parallels here with Peck v UK, PG and JH 
and Perry. In Peck, stills of a CCTV recording distributed by the local 
council of the aftermath of Peck’s suicide attempt on a public street (he 
had attempted to cut his wrists) were broadcast on national television.188 
Strasbourg held that while Peck would have realised that any passers-by 
in the street at the time could have seen him, he could not reasonably 
have anticipated that his actions would end up being viewable by a mass 
audience.189 Similarly, in both PG and JH and Perry, Strasbourg found 
185. However, the situation would be more difficult were B to publish personal 
data about A alongside information about themselves, e.g. where B 
uploads a photograph onto a social networking site that shows A and 
B together. A deletion request would raise a direct conflict between B’s 
autonomy (manifested in their expressive act of posting the photo) and 
A’s autonomy (manifested in their desire to exercise informational control 
over it); see Geoffrey Gomery, “Whose Autonomy Matters? Reconciling 
the Competing Claims of Privacy and Freedom of Expression” (2007) 
27:3 Legal Studies 404.
186. As already noted, in the former case, at least the poster of the data might 
well not even be treated as a data controller: above, at 28. 
187. In the case of Peck, supra note 168, the ECtHR stated that Mr Peck, 
who had attempted to commit suicide on a public street, had a partial 
expectation of privacy as he could not have reasonably foreseen that the 
stills of the CCTV footage of the event would be broadcast on television 
and distributed to other police constabularies.
188.  Peck, ibid at paras 10–15.
189. Ibid at para 62; Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 172 at 17.
46 
 
Brimblecombe & Phillipson, Regaining Digital Privacy?
the existence of an REP due to the fact the claimants’ data had been 
processed in more extensive a manner than they could have reasonably 
foreseen.190
However, the Strasbourg REP test does not naturally apply where 
the data subject had initially uploaded the data to a publically accessible 
online domain: in such circumstances, Strasbourg would presumably 
reason that the claimant should have foreseen that in uploading data 
to a public platform he or she was exposing it to an unknown and 
hence unlimited amount of users. As such, the claimant would appear 
to have voluntarily surrendered control over who accesses the data.191 
This reveals a potential tension between the REP test and Article 17. 
The former focuses upon the degree of publicity that a claimant could 
have reasonably foreseen;192 Article 17 emphasises the importance of a 
data subject’s ability to rescind their consent to previous publication of 
private data.193 As discussed above, this upholds the ability of a subject 
to regain data privacy lost online (even through their own initial act of 
publication), rather than focusing only on their expectations at the time 
of the initial disclosure: in this way Article 17 treats informational self-
determination as a continuing process. 
Despite this difference, can some common ground be found here? In 
Pretty v United Kingdom194 the Court found that the “notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of 
190. PG, supra note 167; Perry, supra note 169. 
191. In all of the following cases the press made personal information known 
without consent: Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171; Von Hannover, supra note 
25; Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170; Von Hannover (no 3), supra note 
170. 
192. Peck, supra note 168; PG, supra note 167; Perry, supra note 169. 
193. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(1)(b). 
194. Pretty v United Kingdom, No 2346/02, [2002] III ECHR 155. 
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its guarantees”.195 As discussed above, the right to delete is designed to 
enhance autonomy in its informational form, by affording individuals 
greater control over dissemination of their personal data.196 Given that 
the application of a conventional REP test would here rob the right to 
delete of much of its effectiveness, it arguably needs some re-working 
so as to recognise informational autonomy as a continuing process.197 
Rather than European courts using Strasbourg’s REP test to limit the 
scope of Article 17 right to delete, it might instead be for Strasbourg 
to reconsider the test in light of Article 17 and the changing nature of 
privacy in the digital age. The “reasonable expectation” of a user might in 
appropriate circumstances be said to encompass the ability to rescind a 
former publication of private data. It should be recalled that if this were 
accepted, this would only ground a prima facie claim for deletion:198 it 
would then have to be balanced against freedom of expression under 
Article 17(3)(a). 
195. Ibid at para 61; see also Begüm Bulak and Alain Zysset, “‘Personal 
Autonomy’ and ‘Democratic Society’ at the European Court of 
Human Rights: Friends or Foes?” (2013) 2:1 UCL Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 230. Althaf Marsoof, “Online Social Networking and 
the Right to Privacy: The Conflicting Rights of Privacy and Expression” 
(2011) 19:2 International Journal of Law and Information 110.
196. Reding, supra note 27. 
197. Above, at 19–20. 
198. Which itself would only apply where withdrawal of consent per se 
grounded an Article 7 claim: see above, at 25–26. 
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V. Factors Going to the Weight of the Article 8 
Claim and Their Possible Application to RTBF
A. The Nature of the Information 
Strasbourg has previously found that bodily integrity,199 sexuality,200 
family grief,201 personal identity202 and personal information203 are all 
aspects of private life under Article 8. In general it has stressed that 
the more intimate the personal data disclosed, the stronger the claim 
to privacy will be.204 An individual’s sexual or romantic life is viewed 
as particularly sensitive and thus an important aspect of their private 
life.205 For example, in Avram v Moldova, women were secretly filmed 
by the police frolicking in a sauna with male police officers in a state of 
partial undress and the footage later passed to local television stations 
and broadcast. Strasbourg found a breach of Article 8, stressing that 
an individual’s sexual and romantic life should be free from unwanted 
observation by others.206 
One area of uncertainty here is the approach taken to “intimate” 
information. What is considered intimate can vary, depending upon 
199. X and Y v The Netherlands, No 8978/80, [1985] 8 EHRR 235; see also 
Lorenc Danaj and Aleks Prifti, “Respect for Privacy from the Strasbourg 
Perspective” (2012) 2012:5 Academicus: International Scientific Journal 
108. 
200. ADT v United Kingdom, No 35765/97, [2000] IX ECHR 295.
201. Pannullo and Forte v France, No 37794/97, [2001] X ECHR 279.
202. Van Kück v Germany, No 35968/97, [2003] VII ECHR 1. 
203. Smirnova v Russia, No 46133/99, [2003] IX ECHR 241.
204. Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170; Von Hannover (no 3), supra note 
170. 
205. See e.g. Dudgeon v United Kingdom, No 7525/76, [1981] 4 EHRR 149; 
and Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 172 at 6.
206. Avram v Moldova, No 41588/05 (5 July 2011) [Avram]; Dirk Voorhoof, 
“European Court of Human Rights: Avram and other v Moldova” (2012) 
1:1 Iris: Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory 1.
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factors such as culture, religion, gender, age and personality type.207 It 
is also fact-sensitive: while Strasbourg generally views data concerning 
an individual’s romantic life as peculiarly intimate, in Lillo-Stenberg v 
Norway it held that a wedding was not necessarily a private occasion.208 
As noted above, while Article 17 covers all personal data, the GDPR 
specifies certain categories as particularly sensitive (above, at 22–23). 
These should, however, be applied with a degree of flexibility, especially 
when assessing unusual or complex claims. At the national level this 
may depend upon what specific provision Member States make to allow 
freedom of expression claims to outweigh the prohibition on processing 
personal data.209 Article 17 itself does not distinguish between sensitive 
and ordinary data, in providing that deletion requests may be refused 
where necessary “for exercising the right of freedom of expression”,210 but 
even when engaging in this kind of “pure” balancing act, courts are likely 
to find that, as the Working Party put it: 
As a general rule, sensitive data … has a greater impact on the data subject’s 
private life than ‘ordinary’ personal data. A good example would be information 
about a person’s health, sexuality or religious beliefs. DPAs are more likely to 
intervene when de-listing requests are refused in respect of search results that 
reveal such information to the public.211 
Following this approach, domestic courts may seek to find ways of 
avoiding automatic consequences that may flow from the classification 
of data as “sensitive”. As Lady Hale said in the leading privacy decision 
of Campbell v MGN Ltd,212 while medical information relating to health 
is generally considered obviously private, “[t]he privacy interest in the 
fact that a public figure has a cold or a broken leg is unlikely to be strong 
enough to justify restricting the press’s freedom to report it. What harm 
207. Chris Hunt, “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: 
Foundational Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling 
Privacy Tort” (2011) 37:1 Queen’s Law Journal 167 at 197–200.
208. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 170 at para 37. 
209. See the example of provisions in the UK’s Data Protection Act 2018, supra 
note 156. 
210. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(3)(a).
211. Article 29 Google Spain Guidelines, supra note 6 at 17 [emphasis added]. 
212. Campbell, supra note 63. 
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could it possibly do”?213 We suggest that courts taking this more flexible, 
fact-sensitive approach should employ a mixed objective-subjective test, 
relying upon a mixture of cultural and contextual factors. These could 
include an examination of what information may normally be considered 
intimate for someone of the same age or religion, as well as an examination 
of a subject’s personal sensitivities: for example, a person who had had 
gender reassignment surgery would likely be particularly sensitive about 
a photograph circulating that showed them as their previous gender.214 
B. The Form of the Information: Images or Text? 
When assessing the strength of Article 8 claims, Strasbourg may take 
into account the form in which the personal data is disclosed — such as 
photographs, sound recordings or written text.215 Thus “privacy may be 
thought of as being domain specific”.216 Strasbourg has treated privacy 
rights relating to photographs as particularly significant: as Gomery 
observes, “it has become plain that the courts treat images of a person 
in a public space differently than they would a description of the person 
in the same place because a photograph may make a data subject clearly 
‘identifiable’”.217 As Marsoof comments in relation to the English decision 
in Douglas v Hello!:218 
213. Ibid at 157.
214. See Hunt, supra note 207 at 197–99 arguing that both individual 
sensitivities and cultural or community norms need to be considered. 
On privacy as particularly engaging certain types of information bearing 
on an individual’s reputation and therefore their dignity, see generally 
Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law” (1980) 89:3 Yale Law 
Journal 421 at 457; Robert Post, “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2000) 
89:6 Georgetown Law Journal 2087; Robert Gerstein, “Intimacy and 
Privacy” in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 266 at 270; and David 
Hughes, “Two Concepts of Privacy” (2015) 31:4 Computer Law & 
Security Review 527 at 534.
215. See Gomery, supra note 185 at 427.
216. Marsoof, supra note 195 at 129.
217. Gomery, supra note 185 at 427 [emphasis added]. 
218. [2006] QB 125 (UK) citing Douglas v Hello!, supra note 77 at para 106.
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the unauthorised publication of photographs has been condemned more 
forcefully than other forms of privacy leaks. In Douglas v Hello! it was observed 
that “[a] photograph can certainly capture every detail of a momentary event 
in a way which words cannot, but a photograph can do more than that. A 
personal photograph can portray, not necessarily accurately, the personality 
and the mood of the subject of the photograph.”219
Similarly, in Von Hannover v Germany (no 2),220 Strasbourg said:
[A] person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her 
personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes 
the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one’s image is 
thus one of the essential components of personal development.221 
Article 17 does not refer to particular forms of personal data but it 
appears likely that many individuals will wish to use it to delete online 
photographs of themselves. Stories abound of online photographs having 
a subsequent detrimental impact on a person’s private life or their career.222 
However other forms of personal data accessible online, including text, 
also have the potential to be significantly detrimental to a data subject’s 
privacy or reputation, especially if they describe intimate details of, for 
example, their sex life. Hence courts and regulators should undertake a 
flexible approach on a case-by-case basis when deciding upon deletion 
requests. It may often be the case that the content of the data and the 
repercussions of its open accessibility on the data subject are more 
important than its form. 
219. Marsoof, supra note 195 at 129. 
220. Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170. 
221. Ibid at para 96. 
222. Daniel Bean, “11 Brutal Reminders That You Can and Will Get Fired 
for What You Post on Facebook” Yahoo (6 May 2014), online: Yahoo 
<https://www.yahoo.com/tech/11-brutal-reminders-that-you-can-and-
will-get-fired-for-84931050659.html>. See e.g. “Teacher sacked for 
posting picture of herself holding glass of wine and mug of beer on 
Facebook” The Daily Mail Online (7 February 2011), online: The Daily 
Mail Online <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1354515/Teacher-sacked-
posting-picture-holding-glass-wine-mug-beer-Facebook.html> (schoolteacher 
Ashley Payne’s employment was terminated due to photographs of her on 
Facebook, showing her drinking alcohol on holiday). 
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C. Is the Data Subject a Public Figure? 
1. The Importance of the “Public Figure” Criterion. 
One of the most important factors used by courts and regulators in 
assessing privacy claims is whether the claimant is a “public figure”. In 
Google Spain the CJEU said that the legitimate interest of the public 
in having information available on social networks “may vary, in 
particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life”.223 
In its commentary on the decision, the Working Party said: “there may 
be information about public figures that is genuinely private and that 
should not normally appear in search results, for example information 
about their health or family members”.224 But it went on:
[A]s a rule of thumb, if applicants are public figures, and the information in 
question does not constitute genuinely private information, there will be a 
stronger argument against de-listing search results relating to them.225
The English High Court, when applying Google Spain domestically, 
found this criterion, of “playing a role in public life” to be 
“broader” than the notion of being a public figure like a politician 
or sportsperson.226 But the notion that the Working Party meant to 
postulate the widest possible approach to the concept of public figure 
seems doubtful. In particular, their explanation that, “[a] good rule of 
thumb is to try to decide where the public having access to the particular 
information … would protect them against improper public or 
professional conduct”,227suggests that the fact that a given celebrity was 
well known to the public would be less important than whether knowing 
the information in question could protect the public against improper 
conduct on their part. Given that members of the public are generally 
not affected by the way in which celebrities behave in their private lives 
this may suggest a more restricted approach. This is supported further by 
223. Google Spain, supra note 4 at para 81 [emphasis added].
224. Article 29 Google Spain Guidelines, supra note 6 at 14.
225. Ibid at 14. 
226. NT1, supra note 113 at para 137. 
227. Article 29 Google Spain Guidelines, supra note 6 at 13. 
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the Working Party’s guidance that:
[t]here is a basic distinction between a person’s private life and their public or 
professional persona. The availability of information in a search result becomes 
more acceptable the less it reveals about a person’s private life.228 
In sum, the view of the Working Party would seem to point away from 
the notion that a celebrity, for example, has a reduced expectation of 
privacy in relation to information concerning core areas of their private 
life, such as their sex-life, family matters or health, simply by virtue of 
their fame. 
In strong contrast, it appears that Google, when deciding RTBF 
requests to date, treats “public figure” as meaning simply “someone 
recognised at national or international level”, something it decides simply 
by “a search of relevant URLs or names”.229 The problem with this is that 
fame can bear no relationship to importance. An extreme and notorious 
example is the overweight 16-year-old boy who became known as “Little 
Fatty”: a picture taken of him in the street by chance went viral in Asia 
with “hit” rates in the tens of millions and eventual coverage in Reuters 
and the Independent.230 Clearly this boy would (at least at the time) 
have fitted Google’s definition of a “public figure”, since he would be 
recognised at national and international level. But if this is the case then 
the notion of “public figure” risks becoming completely un-tethered from 
any links it once had with the notion of a legitimate public interest in the 
persons’ doings, as with a politician or public official. It also suggests that 
one basis for making someone a legitimate target for public attention is 
simply that in the past they have attracted public attention. Under this 
approach the media — and indeed ordinary internet users — can reduce 
a person’s expectation of privacy simply by constantly intruding into their 
privacy. In such circumstances, the very person who needs privacy most 
— because they are constantly suffering from intrusion — is granted less 
of it, because of the very attention they are seeking to escape. It may be 
that this issue will not arise in the large majority of RTBF requests — a 
228. Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
229. Brock, supra note 16 at 51. 
230. Cheung, supra note 78.
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recent study found that fewer than 5% of delisting requests under Google 
Spain concerned “criminal, politicians or high-profile public figures” 231 
— but it is important nonetheless. 
2. Strasbourg’s Approach to “Public Figures”
The position of the Strasbourg Court in relation to the right to privacy 
of public figures and celebrities is unclear. The Court has certainly been 
prepared to find that celebrities and public figures still have rights to 
privacy: Princess Caroline of Monaco won her first case at Strasbourg 
despite the finding by the German Constitutional Court that she was a 
“public figure par excellence”232 — a finding that led the German courts to 
hold that she had to tolerate being constantly followed and photographed 
by paparazzo as she went about her daily life. Strasbourg found that the 
partial denial by German law of a remedy for such constant intrusive 
publicity breached Article 8.233 In Lillo-Stenberg v Norway, Strasbourg 
reiterated that:
in certain circumstances, even where a person is known to the general public, 
he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect 
for his or her private life.234
However, Strasbourg does appear to regard a person’s public figure status 
as reducing their expectation of privacy. Thus, in Von Hannover (no 2) 
the Grand Chamber said that, “[Princess Caroline] and her partner, who 
are undeniably very well known, [cannot be viewed as] ordinary private 
individuals. They must, on the contrary, be regarded as public figures”,235 
and hence afforded a somewhat reduced expectation of privacy. It is 
notable that the reason the Court gave for this finding was not that 
Princess Caroline is a member of a royal family, or that she performs 
official functions (she does not) but simply because of her celebrity 
231. Brock, supra note 16 at 51, citing Google, “Transparency Report: Search 
Removals Under European Privacy Law” Google (2018), online: Google 
<https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/>. 
232. Von Hannover, supra note 25 at paras 19–21. 
233. Ibid. 
234. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171 at para 97.
235. Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170 at para 120.
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status. Similarly, in Axel Springer,236 the claimant “X” was well known to 
the public because he played one of the main characters in a popular TV 
series. The Grand Chamber judgment remarked: 
[T]hat role was, moreover, that of a police superintendent, whose mission was 
law enforcement and crime prevention. That fact was such as to increase the 
public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest for a criminal offence. Having 
regard to those factors and to the terms employed by the domestic courts in 
assessing the degree to which X was known to the public, the Court considers 
that he was sufficiently well known to qualify as a public figure. That consideration 
thus reinforces the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest and of the 
criminal proceedings against him.237 
Furthermore, despite Strasbourg’s comments (above) in Lillo-Stenberg v 
Norway, it ultimately found that the couple in question did not have a 
right to privacy in respect of covert photographs taken of their wedding 
— partly because they were celebrities.238 Such cases appear to show 
Strasbourg finding public figure status not because of the significance of 
the claimant’s role in public life, but simply on the basis that they are well 
known to the public. While in the recent Grand Chamber decision in 
Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France239 the Court appeared in 
places to row back on this, commenting that “the right of public figures 
to keep their private life secret is, in principle, wider where they do not 
hold any official functions”,240 other parts of the judgment deny any such 
a distinction. Thus the Court immediately added that the principle that 
politicians “lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and 
deed by both journalists and the public at large … applies not only to 
politicians, but to every person who is part of the public sphere, whether 
through their actions or their position”.241 The Court confirmed this 
approach in a passage that starts by asserting that “exercising a public 
function or of aspiring to political office” exposes one to greater public 
236. Axel Springer AG v Germany, No 39954/08, [2012] ECHR 227 [Axel 
Springer]. 
237. Ibid at para 99 [emphasis added].
238. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171. 
239. Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v France, No 40454/07, [2015] 
ECHR 992. 
240. Ibid at para 119. 
241. Ibid at para 121 [emphasis added].
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scrutiny, but then adds immediately that “certain private actions by 
public figures cannot be regarded as such, given their potential impact in 
view of the role played by those persons on the political or social scene”242 
— apparently equating the roles of celebrities with politicians and public 
officials. Strasbourg’s notion of “public figure” thus now extends well 
beyond politicians and others exercising real public power, to encompass 
those who are simply famous, for whatever reason. In particular, in Von 
Hannover (no 2) and Axel Springer, Strasbourg appeared to use “public 
figure” to mean simply a person in whose doings the public are interested. 
Used in this way, the public figure doctrine means that the right to privacy 
is sharply reduced by reference simply to public curiosity; the supposedly 
sacrosanct distinction between the public interest and what interests the 
public thus comes close to being (indirectly) collapsed.
3. Conceptual Problems with the “Public Figure” 
Doctrine 
There is, however, a deeper problem with placing reliance on “public 
figure” status as a reason for reducing a person’s prima facie expectation 
of privacy:243 the concept is inherently analytically imprecise and hence 
not conducive of clear judicial reasoning. It acts as a relatively crude and 
generalised proxy for three more precise arguments that by their nature 
should be fact-sensitive.244 The first is that aspects of the lives of some well-
known people may become so widely publicised that they can no longer 
meaningfully be considered private. Quite evidently, this is no more 
than an unhelpful generalization. It clearly will not always be the case 
and cannot be decided in advance of examining the particular situation 
before the court. Nevertheless, a softened version of this argument — 
that being well known to the public per se diminishes one’s reasonable 
242. Ibid at para 120 [emphasis added].
243. The following two paragraphs draw briefly on Phillipson, supra note 76. 
244. The three arguments correspond to those advanced by Dean Prosser in his 
classic exposition of the US privacy torts, see William L Prosser, “Privacy” 
(1960) 48:3 California Law Review 383, discussed and applied in the 
leading New Zealand decision, Hoskings v Runting, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at 
para 120.
57(2018) 4 CJCCL
expectation of privacy — captures exactly Strasbourg’s current approach. 
The second argument is that public figures may reasonably be considered 
to have consented to publicity about their private life, or “waived” their 
right to privacy. Such a contention makes two mistakes: first, it assumes 
that all public figures seek publicity voluntarily — which is by no means 
the case — and second, it draws no distinction between seeking publicity 
for one’s private life, and seeking publicity in relation to one’s vocation, 
surely an elementary distinction. 
The third argument is that there is a degree of legitimate public 
interest in aspects of the private lives of public figures, as, for example, 
in the case of philandering politicians. This, however, is not a reason for 
reducing the scope of the protection given to public figures, but rather a 
description of a countervailing consideration, to be weighed in the balance 
against their right to protection for privacy. Even put in those terms it is 
flawed, because it again amounts to an unhelpful generalization: whether 
there is a legitimate public interest in the life of the public figure will 
depend upon the nature of the information in question, their role in 
public life and whether the information contributes significantly to an 
important public debate. 
Thus far more analytical clarity can be obtained by asking each of 
the above questions separately and in a highly fact-sensitive way. The first 
question then turns into a distinct enquiry as to whether the information 
in question is already in the public domain; in that regard, the Grand 
Chamber of the Strasbourg Court has recently remarked: “[t]he fact 
that information is already in the public domain will not necessarily 
remove the protection of Article 8 of the Convention”.245 The second 
question is whether the public figure has waived their right to privacy 
by, for example, deliberately making an aspect of it public — this is 
considered as a separate factor in the next section. The third question 
falls outside the scope of this article as it concerns, not the expectation of 
privacy of the data subject, but the countervailing freedom of expression 
of the publisher of the data. Thus, the better approach would take note 
of public figure status only as a way of deciding whether to move on 
245. Satakunnan, supra note 60 at para 134. 
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to considering any of the above three distinct issues. This would be a 
considerably more structured and sophisticated methodology — and one 
that avoids lumping together in one category politicians and pop stars, 
central bankers and footballers. 
In this area then, it is suggested that reference to Strasbourg’s “public 
figure” jurisprudence when considering RTBF is more likely to confuse 
than assist. The ability to keep certain aspects of one’s life private is an 
important facet of personal autonomy and human dignity to which 
all individuals are prima facie entitled;246 the approach suggested above 
upholds that principle while allowing for sensible exceptions based upon 
specific consequences that may flow from public figure status. 
D. Prior Conduct of the Person Concerned as Waiving 
Their Right to Privacy
The Working Party’s guidance on Google Spain suggests considering 
whether the content had been “voluntarily made public” by the data 
subject or whether at least they might reasonably have foreseen that it 
“would be made public”.247 Strasbourg has looked more broadly at the 
“prior conduct” of an individual in terms of either shunning or soliciting 
publicity when evaluating the strength of Article 8 claims.248 In terms of 
the former there is some evidence of Strasbourg treating an individual’s 
previous attempts to shield themselves from intrusion as strengthening 
their Article 8 claim. In Von Hannover v Germany (no 3),249 the Court 
acknowledged Princess Caroline’s efforts to keep her private life out of 
the press as a relevant factor (although on the facts sufficiently considered 
246. See e.g. Campbell, supra note 63, upholding in part the privacy claim 
of the supermodel Naomi Campbell; Gavin Phillipson, “Transforming 
Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act” (2003) 66:5 Modern Law Review 726; Gewirtz, 
supra note 58 at 181–82.
247. Article 29 Google Spain Guidelines, supra note 6 at 19. 
248. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171; Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170; Von 
Hannover, supra note 25. 
249. Von Hannover (no 3), supra note 170.
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by the German courts).250 Similarly, in the first Von Hannover case, an 
important factor was that Princess Caroline had made considerable 
efforts to shield herself from the public eye.251 In the case of an ordinary 
person, the element of constant media interest would of course be absent; 
however the basic factor of the individual’s evidenced desire for a degree 
of privacy could be read across to an Article 17 claim in our “data leak” 
scenario: where the initial upload was to a restricted website (for example, 
viewable only to a small group of “friends” on Facebook), this “prior 
conduct” could be argued to evince a desire for a degree of privacy in 
respect of the data, which should lend weight to a deletion request. 
The other side of the coin is situations in which an individual has 
appeared previously to court publicity for their private life, a situation 
which many courts find counts against an expectation of privacy.252 In 
Axel Springer the Strasbourg court found that: 
[t]he conduct of the person concerned prior to publication of the report or the 
fact that the photo and the related information have already appeared in an 
earlier publication are also factors to be taken into consideration … However, 
the mere fact of having cooperated with the press on previous occasions cannot 
serve as an argument for depriving the party concerned of all protection against 
publication of the report or photo at issue.253
The Court’s statement that previous conduct of an individual amounting 
to solicitation of the press would not deprive a data subject of all privacy 
rights implies that such conduct would act only to partially reduce an 
expectation of privacy. As one of us has previously noted, this statement 
“is of little comfort to privacy advocates” since all it does is rule out the 
250. Ibid at para 55. 
251. Von Hannover, supra note 25 at paras 68, 74 (the Court noted that, of the 
complained-of photos, one showed Caroline dining in a secluded place (a 
corner of a restaurant) and another her relaxing within a private members’ 
club).
252. Theakston v MGN Limited, [2002] EWHC 137 (QB) (Ouseley J said 
that since Theakston, a TV presenter, “has courted publicity … and not 
complained at it when, hitherto, it has been very largely favourable to 
him … he cannot complain if publicity given to his sexual activities is less 
favourable in this case” at para 68). 
253. Axel Springer, supra note 236 at para 92 [emphasis added]. 
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extreme (and implausible) “blanket” version of waiver, in which any prior 
disclosures to the press negate all protection for private life.254 Moreover, 
Strasbourg went on to find that as the claimant, a television actor, had 
previously given interviews and in doing so revealed certain details about 
his personal life, his reasonable expectation of privacy (and in turn the 
strength of a claim he could bring under Article 8) had been reduced:
In the Court’s view, he had therefore actively sought the limelight, so that, 
having regard to the degree to which he was known to the public, his 
“legitimate expectation” that his private life would be effectively protected was 
henceforth reduced.255
Notably the judgement did not explain why the claimant’s previous 
choice to reveal certain select details about his personal life led to his 
reasonable expectation of privacy being reduced with respect to other 
personal data which he had not voluntarily disclosed.256 
Under this approach it would appear that a data subject who had 
initially uploaded personal information to an openly accessible platform 
online and subsequently wished to remove it (perhaps after it was been 
posted to third party sites) might be treated as having partially waived 
their right to privacy. The case would also depend on whether the sole 
ground that the defendant had to justify processing was consent. Where 
this is the case, a deletion request can be based simply on revocation of 
consent.257 How this will be considered where the initial consent was to 
what we might term “fully public” processing — that is, publication “to 
the world” on a public website, remains unclear. The circumstances of 
the original uploading could be considered in the overall balance with 
freedom of expression. In such circumstances, courts and regulators 
could consider, for example, whether the information had been put 
online when the data subject was significantly younger258 or at a different 
254. Phillipson, supra note 76 at 151. 
255. Axel Springer, supra note 236 at para 101 [emphasis added].
256. Phillipson, supra note 76 at 150–51. 
257. GDPR, supra note 1, art 17(1)(b); see above, at 25–26. 
258. The GDPR expressly contemplates the special importance of being able 
to delete information placed online when the data subject was a child: see 
GDPR, supra note 1, recital 38, above at 25–26. 
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stage of their life in terms of personal life or career. It could be asked 
whether the data subject now has particularly pressing reasons for 
wanting to delete the information, as where a graduate was seeking to 
remove pictures of themselves behaving raucously at university parties 
because they were now seeking professional employment.259 At worst, the 
Strasbourg “waiver” approach could be read across even to a data subject 
seeking the deletion of personal information published by a third party; if 
so, the claimant could have their privacy claim deemed weaker by virtue 
of previously having voluntarily disclosed different personal information 
online. 
However this notion that a voluntary disclosure of private 
information prevents an individual from being able to complain about 
an involuntary disclosure is wholly incompatible with the core value of the 
individual’s right to control over the release of personal information.260 All 
of us exercise this right to selective disclosure in our social lives: we may 
tell one friend an intimate secret and not another; at times be open, at 
others more reticent. But someone who is shown a friend’s personal letter 
on one occasion does not assume that they have thereby acquired the 
right to read, uninvited, all other such letters. In other words, to suggest 
that public figures should be treated as barred from complaining about 
publicity that is unwanted and intrusive now, because they had previously 
sought it, would deny them the very control over personal information 
that is inherent in the notion of personal autonomy: previous disclosures 
should be treated not as an abandonment of the right to privacy, but an 
exercise of it.261 As suggested above, the advent of a substantive RTBF 
is a chance to re-conceptualise the notion of control over personal 
information as a continuing rather than a one-off event. Here it is to be 
259. See e.g. Alan Henry, “How You’re Unknowingly Embarrassing Yourself 
Online (and How to Stop)” LifeHacker (5 October 2013), online: 
Lifehacker <lifehacker.com/how-youre-embarrassing-yourself-online-
without-knowing-495859415>; Solove, “Speech, Privacy”, supra note 37 
at 17. 
260. Phillipson, supra note 76 at 150 (we draw briefly on this work in the 
paragraph that follows). 
261. See e.g. Nissenbaum, supra note 58; Reiman, supra note 72.
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hoped that the RTBF will influence Strasbourg, rather than the other 
way around. 
E. Circumstances in Which the Information Was 
Obtained
In Lillo-Stenberg v Norway, the Court emphasised the importance of 
considering the way in which intrusive photographs were captured, 
commenting, “the situation would have been different if the photographs 
had been of events taking place in a closed area, where the subjects had 
reason to believe that they were unobserved”.262 Thus a claimant’s lack 
of knowledge that photographs may be taken appears to be a factor 
going to the weight of an Article 8 claim.263 In the first Von Hannover 
case, the Court observed that one particular, rather undignified, image 
of the Princess falling over at a private beach club was “taken secretly 
at a distance of several hundred metres, probably from a neighbouring 
house, whereas journalists’ and photographers’ access to the club was 
strictly regulated”.264 The Court also considered the frequency with 
which photographs were being taken and published, noting that “photos 
appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual 
harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of 
intrusion into their private life or even of persecution”.265 
This factor is easily read across to our “third party scenario”, since 
it is in essence much the same as the large number of cases Strasbourg 
has considered in which the personal data is initially gathered by a third 
party (the press) and then disseminated to a mass audience. The fact that 
the individual had made no disclosure of the data at all would surely add 
strength to their Article 17 claim. In the “data leak” scenario, where the 
initial upload was given only restricted access e.g. to Facebook “friends”, 
and the leak to public platforms occurred without notice or consent, 
it would be easier to draw parallels with the notion of surreptitious 
262. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171 at para 39. 
263. Von Hannover, supra note 25 at para 68.
264. Ibid at para 68.
265. Ibid at para 59 [emphasis added]. 
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gathering, thus strengthening the privacy side of the scales. Here an 
analogy could be drawn with cases like Peck and Von Hannover: just as 
individuals appearing in public places accept that they will be subject to 
casual observations by passers-by, but do not accept the risk of this being 
converted, by press coverage into essentially mass-observation, so those 
uploading pictures to be seen only by “friends” would not anticipate 
the far greater coverage that would result if the information leaks to 
publically-available sites. 
As noted above, this argument becomes harder where the initial 
upload was to a publically accessible website: it could then be argued 
that the data subject should have foreseen subsequent greater publicity, 
though this might depend on the scale and intrusiveness of that publicity. 
If the further dissemination was of such a scale or nature as to amount to 
harassment, parallels could be drawn to the circumstances surrounding 
photographs captured of Princess Caroline in Von Hannover v Germany.266 
Finally there is the scenario in which personal information had been 
uploaded to an openly accessible website but on an anonymous basis, 
only for the data subject to be later identified against their wishes. Courts 
and regulators should take a context-sensitive approach here, recognising 
the key expressive value in being able to “share privately”.267 
F. Does the Personal Data Relate to a Public or Private 
Location?
Several Strasbourg cases focus upon the physical location in which 
personal data was obtained in deciding whether it warrants protection 
under Article 8.268 A claim to privacy in respect of a photograph taken 
in a public street is less likely to attract Article 8 protection than if 
the subject of the picture was in a private dwelling.269 Lillo-Stenberg v 
266. Von Hannover, supra note 25. 
267. See The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd, [2009] EWHC 1358 
(QB) for a case that failed to recognize the importance of this value; the 
notion of “sharing privately” comes from Mills, supra note 35. 
268. Von Hannover, supra note 25; Von Hannover (no 2), supra note 170; Peck, 
supra note 168.
269. See e.g. Lillo-Stenberg, supra note 171. 
64 
 
Brimblecombe & Phillipson, Regaining Digital Privacy?
Norway concerned photos of a wedding of a celebrity couple who had 
married outdoors on a publically accessible islet.270 Strasbourg upheld 
that Icelandic court’s judgment that Article 10 should prevail over the 
couple’s Article 8 claim to bar publication of the photos, partly because 
it was an outdoor wedding taking place in a public place and holiday 
destination.271 
However other cases show a more nuanced approach. In Pfeifer v 
Austria272 Strasbourg said that Article 8 encompasses “a person’s physical 
and psychological integrity”.273 When attempting to define the scope 
of the right to privacy in Niemietz v Germany,274 the Court said that 
“it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in 
which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and 
to exclude there entirely the outside world”,275 seemingly advocating a 
flexible reading of what a private zone could encompass.276 However, the 
key case here is the seminal Von Hannover v Germany277 in which the 
Court stressed “there is … a zone of interaction … with others, even in 
a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’”.278 The 
German courts had held that photographs taken in a physically public 
location of someone they considered a public figure par excellence must 
be tolerated; the only exceptions were images showing Princess Caroline 
with her children or in a “secluded place”, such as a quiet corner of a 
restaurant. Strasbourg disagreed, finding that this “secluded place” test 
was unacceptably narrow; the images depicting Princess Caroline in a 
public place deserved protection under Article 8 as they gave viewers an 
270. Ibid at paras 5–8. 
271. Ibid at paras 39–44.
272. Pfeifer v Austria, No 24733/04, [2011] ECHR 328. 
273. Ibid; Bulak & Zysset, supra note 195 at 234. 
274. Niemietz v Germany, No 13710/88, [1992] 16 EHRR 97. 
275. Ibid at para 29.
276. This approach potentially conflicts with the majority’s viewpoint in 
Campbell, supra note 63, that some information is “obviously private”, see 
Moreham, supra note 50 at 646. 
277. Von Hannover, supra note 25. 
278. Ibid at para 50; Avram, supra note 206 at para 37; Gomery, supra note 185 
at 409. 
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insight into her personality and “psychological integrity”.279
The above jurisprudence has obvious relevance to RTBF claims and, 
if followed, should result in courts and regulators resisting crude notions 
that an event taking place in a public or semi-public environment cannot 
for that reason be considered worthy of privacy protection.280 
VI. Conclusion 
At the time of writing, Article 17 is only a few days old and its proper 
interpretation and likely impact remain matters of profound uncertainty. 
This article has attempted, using Strasbourg’s privacy case law as its primary 
guide, to offer some preliminary answers to the most pressing questions 
surrounding the application of the newly-formulated right to online 
expression. The answers it has proposed are necessarily tentative: much 
of the analysis has involved applying case-law developed in response to 
very different scenarios from the online deletion right in the GDPR. But 
we hope that our analysis has at least shown that the RTBF has profound 
implications for how we think about online privacy. It may be that in the 
end Article 17 influences Strasbourg’s case-law as much as the other way 
around. What is certain is that far more work — by regulators, courts and 
scholars — is needed to fully work out what Article 17 will mean and 
how it will impact the world of online expression. Most importantly, we 
do not yet know how significant a contribution it will make to its overall 
279. Bryce Clayton Newell, “Public Places, Private Lives: Balancing Privacy 
and Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom” (Proceedings of the 
77th ASIS&T Annual Meeting, vol 51, at 1–10, 2014) at 6, online: Social 
Science Research Network <https://ssrn.com/abstract=247909>; Roger 
Toulson, “Freedom of Expression and Privacy” (2007) 41:2 The Law 
Teacher 139 at 140. 
280. Prosser, supra note 244 (noting that “[t]he decisions indicate that 
anything visible in a public place may be recorded and given circulation 
by means of a photograph, to the same extent as by a written description, 
since this amounts to nothing more than giving publicity to what is 
already public and what any one present would be free to see” at 394). 
For a forensic critique see E. Paton-Simpson, “Private Circles and Public 
Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of ‘Private Facts’” (1998) 
61:3 Modern Law Review 318, especially 321–326.
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goal: the enhancement of our informational autonomy online and with 
it, the greater freedom to make life choices that might be inhibited by the 
fear of behaviour being recorded in permanent form online recedes.281 As 
Mayer-Schönberger puts it:
Since the beginning of time, for us humans, forgetting has been the norm 
and remembering the exception. Because of digital technology and global 
networks, however, this balance has shifted. Today … forgetting has become 
the exception, and remembering the default.282
We are about to find out how far the right to be forgotten can start to 
shift this balance back. 
281. Westin, supra note 58 at 56; Francis Chlapowski, “The Constitutional 
Protection of Informational Privacy” (1991) 71:1 Boston University Law 
Review 133; Gerstein, supra note 214; Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy” 
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